



RICH MAN, POOR MAN 
DEVELOPMENT DIAMONDS AND POVERTY DIAMONDS: 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE 
IN THE ARTISANAL ALLUVIAL DIAMOND FIELDS OF AFRICA 
SUMMARY AND A PROPOSAL 
DIAMONDS HAVE BEEN AN IMPORTANT ENGINE OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN MANY COUNTRIES: SOUTH AFRICA, 
BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA AND OTHERS. DIAMONDS HAVE ALSO HELPED FUEL DEVASTATING WARS IN ANGOLA, SIERRA 
LEONE AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO. THE "PEACE" THAT NOW PREVAILS IN THESE COUNTRIES IS 
SUPPORTED BY MAJOR UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS THAT IN THE LONG RUN ARE NOT SUSTAINABLE. THESE 
COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, NOW HAVE AN OPPORTUNITYTO BUILD, TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY, AND 
TO INSTITUTE REFORMS WHICH WILL TURN DIAMONDS FROM A LIABILITY INTO AN ASSET. 
The diamond industry has often portrayed diamonds in this way - 
as a developmental asset: "development diamonds" and even 
"prosperity diamonds". Botswana, South Africa and Namibia are 
often held up as models. The World Bank puts governance at the 
centre of its recovery formula, but adds that "poverty increases 
the likelihood of civil war... the key root cause of conflict is the 
failure of economic development." This study, which involved many 
weeks of travel by researchers in Guinea and in the diamond fields 
of Sierra Leone, Angola and the DRC goes beyond exhortation 
and textbook nostrums and examines the reality on the ground. 
It goes directly to the one million diggers who earn a subsistence 
living from alluvial diamonds. It examines the real economic 
potential of alluvial diamonds for changing their lives and for 
generating meaningful macroeconomic growth. 
The study has produced some startling findings. First, it concludes 
that artisanal alluvial diamond mining will never generate 
large amounts of revenue for the governments in question. 
The nature of alluvial diamonds and of artisanal mining makes any 
kind of meaningful taxation almost impossible. It is important, 
therefore, to ensure that any expectations about these diamonds 
are realistic. Second, it concludes that most artisanal diggers, 
working in a casino economy and hoping to strike it rich, 
actually earn an average of only a dollar a day. Their work is 
hard, dirty, and it is completely outside the formal job market. This 
places them squarely in the "absolute poverty" income bracket. 




Given the large mark-up at the first point of sale, and the almost 
complete absence of a free market diamond economy in the 
digging fields, there are opportunities to increase the earn- 
ings of miners. The constraints, however, are political, economic, 
social and historical, and they are enormous. And there is a 
paradox: if the earnings of miners go up, more may be attracted 
to an already over-crowded enterprise. This does not make the 
challenge less important, however. Real change could reduce 
the chaos and instability that the diamond fields spawn. 
At a minimum, diamonds could be the generator of decent 
incomes for hundreds of thousands of families, rather than 
the centre of unsafe, unhealthy, badly-paid piecework. There 
are enough pilot projects and enough experience to know that 
the potential is real. 
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THIS STUDY, WHICH INVOLVED EXTENSIVE TRAVEL IN THE DIAMOND AREAS OF SIERRA LEONE, ANGOLA AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, WAS CARRIED OUT ON BEHALF OF GLOBAL WITNESS AND PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, BETWEEN 
JUNE AND SEPTEMBER 2004, BY SEVERAL RESEARCHERS, INCLUDING CHRISTINE GORDON AND RALPH HAZLETON. ADDITIONAL 
WORK WAS CONTRIBUTED BY OCEAN-RDC, GREMIO ABC AND OTHERS. IAN SMILLIE SERVED AS OVERALL EDITOR. FUNDING FOR 
THE STUDY WAS PROVIDED BY THE COOPERATIVE BANK (UK), THE BRITISH DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IRELAND, THE PEACEBUILDING FUND OF THE CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
OXFAM AMERICA. THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS AND THE AUTHORS WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO ASSISTED 
IN THE RESEARCH, AND THOSE WHO OFFERED HELPFUL COMMENTS ON EARLY DRAFTS. 
A PROPOSAL 
CHANGE WILL NOT HAPPEN IF IT IS LEFTTO CHANCE, TO SLOGANS 
AND STUDIES, AND IF THOSE WHO KNOW DIAMONDS SAY THAT 
THE RESPONSIBILITY LIES ELSEWHERE. WE HOPE THAT THE 
FINDINGS IN THIS REPORT WILL BE CONSIDERED WITHIN THE 
COMMUNITY OF ORGANIZATIONS, GOVERNMENTS AND COMPA- 
NIES THAT HAVE, UNTIL NOW, FOCUSSED MAINLY ON THE 
ISSUE OF CONFLICT DIAMONDS. WE HOPE IT WILL GENERATE 
DEBATE, BETTER INFORMATION, AND NEW IDEAS. 
We do not propose detailed solutions in this report, but the prob- 
lems and questions can now be articulated more clearly. It is 
important to get beyond the conflict diamond cure that is the 
Kimberley Process, to a level of longer-term prevention that is 
both practical and meaningful. 
Solutions must go beyond a few pilot projects; there must be 
a quantum change in the artisanal alluvial diamond fields of 
Africa. Because alluvial diamonds provide a livelihood for a million 
miners and their families, this is as big a development challenge as 
any in Africa. And because of the casino economy underlying the 
enterprise, alluvial diamonds continue to represent a major human 
security challenge in half a dozen countries or more. 
Our longer-term aim is to improve this report, the findings and 
the recommendations, and then to organize a larger forum 
that will bring a wider group of stakeholders into the 
discussion: the governments of countries where alluvial 
diamonds are mined, the Kimberley Process, the World 
Bank, UNDP, the African Development Bank, bilateral 
agencies, a wider cross-section of the diamond industry 
and major international and African NGOs. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE TERRIBLE WARS IN SIERRA LEONE AND ANGOLA, FUELLED IN 
PART BY DIAMONDS, HAVE ENDED. AND THERE IS A FRAGILE 
PEACE PROCESS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO. 
"THERE ARE NO MORE CONFLICT DIAMONDS," SOME SAY. "WE 
HAVE TURNED A CORNER AND WE CAN NOW MOVE ON TO THE 
BRIGHT SUNLIT UPLANDS OF `DEVELOPMENT DIAMONDS' - AND 
EVEN `PROSPERITY DIAMONDS'." WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN GREAT 
CHANGES IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, HUBRIS CAN BE DANGEROUS. 
It is unlikely that UNITA in Angola or the RUF in Sierra Leone 
could reconstitute themselves or be copied in the short run. 
With the world's three largest UN peacekeeping forces at work 
in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC, a serious damper has been 
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placed on rebel opportunity and viability, both military and 
economic. But West Africa - especially Liberia, C6te d'lvoire 
and Guinea - remains unstable, as does the eastern DRC. 
In October 2004, there were still 340,000 Liberian refugees 
scattered across West Africa, more than 13 per cent of the 
country's entire population. 
It is worth noting as well, that as of mid 2004, UNAMSIL, UNMIL 
and MONUC had a total of 35,000 troops on the ground - 
the equivalent of almost four divisions - with combined budgets of 
more than $1.8 billion to June 2005.* This is an enormous expense, 
and it is not sustainable. It does, however, give the governments 
involved time to heal wounds, to create new physical and political 
infrastructure, and to try to establish conditions for a more lasting 
peace. The future of these countries now turns on whether pro- 
ductive activities can be made available to the young men who 
fought in the wars, and the other young men coming after them 
- productive enterprises that outweigh the return on more 
dangerous activities. 
A recent World Bank publication compares the evolution of 
Botswana and Sierra Leone, which in 1970 were both low-income 
countries with significant diamond resources.' In Botswana, 
diamonds were the engine of growth, making the country one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world, while Sierra Leone 
has been last on the UN's Human Development Index for more 
than a decade. Botswana, the World Bank says, maintained a 
"stable and well-functioning democracy" while in Sierra Leone, 
"poor governance led to the state's collapse and created the 
incentive as well as the opportunity for a rebellion throughout the 
199os." The issue, from this perspective, is one of governance. 
A corrupt Sierra Leone government "lost control over its assets" 
allowing organized criminals to take over diamond mining. 
Youth were marginalized, the economy collapsed and a rebel leader 
then found it "relatively easy" to finance a war through diamond 
extraction. The message here is that African countries must now 
put their houses in order. The Bank's message has a second part. 
Civil wars are heavily concentrated in the poorest countries: 
"poverty increases the likelihood of civil war... the key root 
cause of conflict is the failure of economic development.s2 
This study deals with the twin issues of governance and devel- 
opment in relation to the diamond economies of Sierra Leone, 
Angola and the DRC. But it posits that control over diamond 
resources is not simply a matter of establishing a "stable and well 
functioning democracy", and that even if achieved, this in and 
TERMINOLOGY 
AND ACRONYMS 
KIMBERLITE DIAMONDS ARE FOUND IN VOLCANIC "PIPES" 
THAT CAN BE FENCED AND MINED WITH HEAVY, CAPITAL INTEN- 
SIVE EQUIPMENT. ALLUVIAL DIAMONDS RESULT FROM MILLIONS 
OF YEARS OF EROSION ON SOME KIMBERLITES, AND THE SPREAD- 
ING OF DIAMONDS BY RIVERS OVER VAST GEOGRAPHIC AREAS. 
ARTISANAL MINING (BY ARTISANS) MEANS SMALL-SCALE MINING 
WITH THE SIMPLEST OF TOOLS, ON A SUBSISTENCE LEVEL. 
DACE. Diamond Area Community Development Fund 
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECOW:`: Economic Community of West African States 
FAA Forcas Armadas Angolanas 
GGDO Government Gold and Diamond Office 
ILO International Labour Organization 
MIBA Societe Miniere de Bakwanga 
MMO Mines Monitoring Officer 
MON( Mission des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo 
PDA Peace Diamond Alliance 
RUF Revolutionary United Front 
SAESSCAM Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining 
SODIAM Sociedade de Comercializacao de Diamantes 
UNA',:i ti United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
UNI TA. Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola 
UNIT' = United Nations Mission in Liberia 
USAIL United States Agency for International Development 
of itself is no guarantee that diamonds will be an engine of 
development. 
The geological nature of diamonds creates special situations. 
The Kimberlite mines of Botswana, Canada and Russia can be 
fenced and protected. Alluvial diamonds, however, scattered 
over hundreds of square miles, present a very difficult regulatory 
problem. This is especially true in the DRC, Sierra Leone and 
Angola, but it is also true of Guinea, Liberia, C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana, 
the Central African Republic and elsewhere. The colonial regimes 
* MONUC alone, which hod a mandate of io,8oo peacekeepers, began increasing its troop strength to 24,000 starting in October 2004. 
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in Angola and the Congo exercised control over natural resources 
in a particularly harsh manner. And both countries descended into 
fratricidal warfare within weeks of independence, and never 
recovered. Resource exploitation, which might have been an asset 
for development, never had a chance. In Sierra Leone the colonial 
regime was less harsh, but the "stable and well functioning 
democracy" inherited at independence was veneer-thin. Diamonds 
in particular had never been well controlled, and were the subject 
of massive (and failed) crackdowns before and after independence. 
To make matters worse in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone, the 
alluvial diamond fields acted as a magnet for hundreds of thou- 
sands of young men who, in each case, eventually became recruits 
for, or slaves of, rebel forces. 
And when rebel movements began to look at diamonds, they 
found a completely unregulated and highly secretive international 
trading system that was already adept at avoiding unwanted 
taxes and unwanted attention. It took two to tango. The problem 
was not only one of absent control and absent democracies; 
it was also the attendant presence of buyers who asked no ques- 
tions in their drive for the lowest possible price. 
The wars ended for various reasons. Each country was different. 
But the common theme was diamonds. Intense media attention, 
growing industry awareness, UN reports and embargos, and 
NGO investigations all helped to choke the supply of funds to 
Charles Taylor and the RUF in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Jonas 
Savimbi sold fewer diamonds in his last year than at any time over 
the previous decade. The Kimberley Process - weak and faltering 
as it was in its first three years - helped, by ensuring that all gov- 
ernments and the entire diamond industry were involved, and by 
demonstrating that there could never be a return to "business as 
usual" where conflict diamonds were concerned. 
If the Kimberley Process grows the teeth it needs, it can reduce 
many of the opportunities that still exist for laundering illicit dia- 
monds into the legitimate trade. Already there has been progress. 
In 2003, Sierra Leone recorded its largest export level in more than 
two decades, at US$76 million in total. This was an 85 per cent 
increase over 2002 and triple what was officially exported in 
2001. The 2004 figures are even better. And the DRC exported 
an all-time record of $642 million in rough diamonds, a 62 per 
cent increase over the previous year. Both governments attribute 
the increase, in part, to the Kimberley Process. 
ONE MILLION DIAMOND DIGGERS 
But there is a problem overshadowing the bright statistics, the 
tentative peace arrangements and the efforts, at least in some 
places, to build democratic and responsible government. A huge 
number of young men still swarm over the alluvial diamond fields 
THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME (KPCS) FOR ROUGH DIAMONDS CAME INTO EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 2003. OVER 
40 COUNTRIES, PLUS ALLTHOSE REPRESENTED BYTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, PARTICIPATE. UNDER THE TERMS OFTHIS AGREEMENT, 
EACH PARTICIPANT AGREES TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE TO ACCOMPANY ANY ROUGH DIAMONDS BEING EXPORTED FROM ITS TERRITORY, 
CERTIFYING THAT THE DIAMONDS ARE CONFLICT-FREE. EACH COUNTRY MUSTTHEREFORE BE ABLE TO TRACK THE DIAMONDS BEING 
OFFERED FOR EXPORT BACK TO THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE MINED, OR TO THE POINT OF IMPORT. ALL IMPORTING COUNTRIES 
AGREE NOT TO ALLOW ANY ROUGH DIAMONDS INTO THEIR TERRITORY WITHOUT AN APPROVED KPCS CERTIFICATE. 
GIVEN THE LARGE VOLUME OF DIAMONDS BEING TRADED ACROSS BORDERS, IT HAS ALSO BEEN DEEMED NECESSARY TO PRODUCE 
TRADE AND PRODUCTION STATISTICS WHICH CAN BE COMPARED FROM TIME TO TIME IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE VOLUMES 
LEAVING ONE COUNTRY MATCH THOSE ENTERING ANOTHER. AS OF LATE 2004, THE KPCS STATISTICAL SYSTEM WAS STILL UNDER 
DEVELOPMENT. A FURTHER GENERAL VERIFICATION PROBLEM EXISTS: MONITORING, WHICH MUST BE UNIVERSAL IN ORDER TO 
BE EFFECTIVE, REMAINS A VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENT IN THE KPCS. MANY PEER REVIEWS HAVE NOW BEEN CARRIED OUT, HOWEVER, 
AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT AT LEAST HALF OF THE PARTICIPANTS WILL HAVE BEEN REVIEWED BY MID 2005. 
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of Africa. In Sierra Leone there may be as many as 120,000. 
In the Congo, the government estimates 700,000. In Angola, 
despite the recent expulsions of illicit Congolese diggers, there 
may still be 15o,ooo. Taken together with diggers in Guinea, 
Ghana and elsewhere, there are probably a million African artisanal 
alluvial diamond diggers. Almost all of them are unregistered 
and unregulated. These young men, who work for nothing except 
One thing is clear: given the nature of alluvial diamonds, and 
given the histories of Sierra Leone, Angola and the Congo, 
"development diamonds" will not happen by themselves. They will 
not come from foreign troops and an unsustainable $1.8 billion 
peacekeeping effort, or from ritual calls for stable and demo- 
cratic government. And they will not come from mass arrests 
and expulsions. 
ONE THING I S CLEAR: GIVEN THE NATURE OF ALLUVIAL DIAMONDS, 
AND GIVEN THE HISTORIES OF SIERRA LEONE, ANGOLA AND THE CONGO, 
"DEVELOPMENT DIAMONDS" WILL NOT HAPPEN BY THEMSELVES. 
what they are lucky enough to find - and individually they don't 
find much - produce ten or maybe twenty per cent of the dia- 
monds that go into the jewellery shops of London, Tokyo, Paris 
and New York. They are an important port of the diamond industry. 
But they are potentially dangerous, and over the past decade 
they have shown just how dangerous they can be. 
Since colonial times, African governments have sought to limit the 
influx of people into alluvial diamond areas by a variety of means: 
pass systems; arrests; fines; imprisonment. Amnesty International 
has reported the shooting of illegal diggers on a mining concession 
in the DRC, and Angola has recently deported tens of thousands 
of illegal Congolese diamond miners. None of these efforts has 
ever worked for long.3 The issue is not that the returns on 
alluvial diamond mining are high. The work is dirty, hard, sometimes 
dangerous, and it produces little more than a couple of hundred 
dollars a year for most diggers. In fact, the competitive scramble 
in a largely informal economy only serves to drive prices down 
at the pit level, creating a lucrative business for middlemen. 
There are two issues here. The first has to do with the creation of 
viable economic alternatives for those who dig diamonds. This is 
a macro economic challenge that is considerably more daunting 
for countries emerging from war than others. The second is about 
converting the informal diamond digging economy into a more 
formal one. Cooperatives and other arrangements which pro- 
vide organized workers with a better price for their labour could 
help to convert the competition for diamonds into competition 
for jobs. Given the number of people involved, and given the 
half century of destabilization fostered by an unregulated diamond 
trade, any successful investment could yield major dividends. 
Working with African researchers and NGOs, Partnership Africa 
Canada and Global Witness have spent several months examining 
the problems and potential for "development diamonds" in Angola, 
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Each 
country is addressed individually in the following sections, but 
some common - and disturbing - themes have emerged from 
the research. 
MACRO LEVEL DEVELOPMENT 
Botswana is regularly held up as a model to which other diamond 
producing governments should aspire: Democratic, efficient and 
honest, Botswana is able to generate more than $2 billion worth 
of diamonds annually, of which 70 per cent ends up in government 
coffers. This is a lot of money for development. 
While it is true that Botswana stands out in front of others where 
democracy, efficiency and probity are concerned, it has other 
advantages related to diamonds. First, its diamond mines are 
incredibly rich - the richest in the world. More importantly 
from a macro economic point of view, they are all kimberlite mines. 
This means that the mines are easily fenced and controlled. It also 
means that mining operations are highly capital intensive. 
The number of direct jobs in Botswana's diamond industry is 
barely more than 6,ooo. Further, despite all of the contrary 
World Bank and IMF advice to developing countries, the gov- 
ernment of Botswana has taken a direct share in the ownership 
of the diamond enterprise. Not only does it own 5o per cent 
of the mining operations in partnership with De Beers - which owns 
the rest - it also owns to per cent of De Beers. 
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None of these advantages and opportunities is open to the gov- 
ernments of countries with alluvial diamond mines. The "mines", 
which cover thousands of square kilometres, cannot be fenced, 
and can only be policed at great cost. There are few, if any, 
major corporate investors, and efforts at government control and 
ownership have inevitably failed. The glittering 70 per cent return 
to the government of Botswana on its diamond investment is held 
up as a model to others, but it is little more than a cruel mirage 
where alluvial diamonds are concerned. 
Apart from licensing fees, which are simply ignored by mine 
operators if they become exorbitant, governments rely mainly on 
export taxes for diamond income. Typically, and in major contrast 
to Botswana, these have been set at three per cent of the export 
value. When governments have raised the tax, diamonds have 
simply disappeared. The most prominent example has been the 
massive traffic in diamonds out of the Republic of Congo (ROC) 
- Brazzaville over the past decade. With an export tax of two per 
cent, the ROC - which has few diamond resources of its own - 
became a magnet for smuggled goods from the DRC, where 
the export tax is four per cent. The $20,000 differential on each 
million dollar shipment made the river crossing between Kinshasa 
and Brazzaville well worth the effort. 
It can be concluded, therefore, with some assurance, that 
artisanal alluvial diamond mining will never generate large 
amounts of revenue for the governments in question. The best- 
case scenario is the DRC, where export taxes on $584 million 
worth of alluvial diamonds yielded $23 million in government 
revenue in 2003, and where licence fees - if properly collected 
(a very distant prospect) - might conceivably yield another $5o 
or $6o million. Angola currently aims to purchase $zo million 
a month worth of diamonds from artisanal miners.* At most, 
this would yield about $7 million in annual export taxes, plus a 
further million dollars or so in licence fees. The net revenue to 
the government after costs might be four or five million dollars 
a year. This is very small in relation to the $3 billion or more 
generated each year by the oil industry, and it is small in relation 
to the overall development budget of the country. In the case of 
Sierra Leone, this report shows that the net diamond revenue 
to government is less than three million dollars annually, with little 
prospect of any significant increase. In the case of even smaller 
producers such as Liberia, the cost of running a Kimberley Process 
certification system would actually exceed the tax revenue 
generated. 
}0 µs.318 
Despite the low levels of revenue generated for governments from 
artisanal alluvial diamond mining, the value of these diamonds in 
Angola, DRC and Sierra Leone may be as high as a billion dollars 
annually. As noted above, this generates income for an estimated 
million artisanal diggers and their families. While these numbers 
are crude, some of the detailed studies in this paper bear out the 
mathematics. This is important from a development perspective. 
But one billion dollars divided by one million diggers equals 
$looo per person, per annum. And as the case studies show, 
while this is the gross per-digger export value, most diggers 
receive less than one third of the value of what they mine. 
Even in Ghana, where artisanal diamond mining - known locally 
as "galamsey" - is small in relation to the overall economy, the 
problems are large. Children are widely involved; residents of the 
mining areas complain of environmental degradation, water 
pollution, the influx of a migrant labour force with high rates 
of HIV/AIDS. Attempts by the government to deal with the 
illegal miners have often resulted in violence. And most alluvial 
diamond diggers lead hard, dangerous and unhealthy lives. 
With average earnings of less than a dollar a day they fall 
squarely into the broad category of "absolute poverty". 
In each country it is the middlemen - the diamond dealers, 
negociants, patrocinadores and the exporters - who take the lion's 
share of the income. In Sierra Leone, 74 per cent of all exports 
in 2003 were from five companies or individuals, all of them foreign 
nationals. In the DRC and Sierra Leone (and in Angola until 
recently), a high proportion of the middlemen have also been 
foreign nationals. The result is a concentration of profits in the 
hands of a small number of dealers and exporters, most of whom 
re-invest very little in the industry or the country. The value they 
add to the diamond trade is the pittance they pay the diggers 
- often little more than a meal a day - and the sieves, shovels, 
pumps and loans needed to keep the diggers working. 
Ending the wars has not changed this. Nor will democracy and 
good governance in itself make many changes. Good governance, 
combined with the Kimberley Process, may reduce smuggling, 
but it will not provide better returns to diggers. Although each 
one hopes for the "big find" in this casino economy, it rarely 
happens, and diamond digging in reality is little more than a 
subsistence enterprise: "poverty diamonds". The poverty, the 
hundreds of thousands of willingly exploited adults and 
* Even this volume is hypothetical, announced by an optimistic SODIAM official at the opening of a first buying office in Luanda in August 2004. 
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children, and the volatility of the diamond fields make for a 
highly flammable social cocktail, one that has ignited several 
times in recent years, with tragic results. 
It does not take an economic wizard to understand that there are 
possibilities for change at the micro level. This study shows that 
the large mark-up between the digger and the first point of sale 
is enormous. And the mark-up between the first buyer and the 
exporter is also large. If exporters could move closer to diggers 
and pay better prices - i.e. loser to market value - those who actually 
mine the diamonds might be able to move beyond their poverty- 
level incomes.* The change would probably not be dramatic in 
absolute terms, because even if the return to a digger were to 
increase threefold, the total would not be great. But in relative 
terms the change would be enormous. Tripling the income of 
a million Africans living in poverty would be a major achievement. 
Examples of i 
The government of Sierra Leone has created a "Diamond Area 
Community Development Fund". A percentage of the diamond 
export tax is returned to communities where diamonds are 
mined. The aim is to give something back to diamond commu- 
nities and to encourage local commitment to legal operations. 
In 2003 more than $500,000 was returned to diamond 
mining communities through the DACDF; 
The government of the DRC has created SAESSCAM, 
Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining, 
to assist with the creation of artisanal mining cooperatives, 
training and financial assistance; 
With support from USAID, the Peace Diamond Alliance in 
Sierra Leone is organizing diggers in a cooperative arrangement 
and plans to hold diamond tenders for local and international 
buyers in the diamond area itself, bringing international 
prices to the diamonds, instead of the reverse. 
So far, however, these pilot initiatives remain small, and each one 
has its own problems. Other generic initiatives could include: 
Loans to diggers, enabling them to invest in alternatives to 
diamond mining, such as agriculture; 
Loans to diggers to release them from the ubiquitous 
"supporter" systems, which are tantamount to indentured 
labour; 
Training for diggers to increase their productivity and their 
awareness of diamond values; 
Media campaigns to build public awareness and commitment 
in diamond mining areas to fair pricing and legitimate behaviour 
on the part of miners, traders and government officials; 
External assistance aimed at increasing governmental capacity 
for effective oversight of labour, safety and environmental 
regulations, and probity in the overall diamond trading system. 
e- to change 
Despite the potential, the social, historical and economic obstacles 
to change are enormous: 
Diggers expect and need immediate payment for what they 
find. Any initiative that requires them to wait, even if the 
promised prices are higher, is likely to run into problems; 
Getting a digging operation licensed can be enormously 
time consuming and expensive. The Sierra Leone case study 
outlines the fifteen costly and time-consuming steps required 
before any mining can officially commence. Bribes are required 
at almost every step of the way. The same is true for dealer 
and export licences. Systems must be streamlined and the cost 
must be reduced before any successful pilots can be taken 
to scale; 
Meaningful change in the political economy of alluvial dia- 
mond buying is a zero sum game. In other words, better prices 
for diggers means lower prices for middlemen. There are large 
amounts of money involved, and the potential for harassment 
and violence is enormous. Governments will have to make 
special arrangements to encourage and protect initiatives 
that provide better prices to diggers, and they may be 
obliged to de-license or restrict some existing dealers. 
* This is not to suggest a weakening of African trading infrastructures; rather it suggests that reductions in the large profits of middlemen could be made in ways that favour better prices for diggers. 
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ARTISANAL MINING: 
NOT A PRETTY PICTURE 
SMALL-SCALE MINING IS OF GREAT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
SIGNIFICANCE. IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED THAT THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD SMALL-SCALE MINING INVOLVES APPROXIMATELY 13 
MILLION PEOPLE DIRECTLY, AND AFFECTS THE LIVELIHOODS OF 
A FURTHER 80 TO 100 MILLION PEOPLE." 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has specified 
one of the major difficulties with small-scale mining: 
SMALL-SCALE MINING FALLS INTO TWO BROAD CATE- 
GORIES: THE MINING AND QUARRYING OF INDUSTRI- 
AL MINERALS AND CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS ON A 
SMALL SCALE; AND THE MINING OF RELATIVELY HIGH- 
VALUE MINERALS, NOTABLY GOLD AND PRECIOUS 
STONES. THE FIRST IS MOSTLY FOR LOCAL MARKETS 
AND EXISTS IN EVERY COUNTRY. REGULATIONS TO 
CONTROL AND TAX THESE MINES AND QUARRIES ARE 
OFTEN IN PLACE, AND THE EXISTENCE OF INFORMAL OR 
ILLEGAL OPERATIONS AT THIS LEVEL IS GENERALLY ATTRIB- 
UTABLE TO A LACK OF INSPECTION AND THE LAX ENFORCE- 
MENT OF REGULATIONS RATHER THAN TO THE LACK OF A 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK, MUCH THE SAME AS FOR SMALL 
MANUFACTURING PLANTS. THE OUTPUT FROM THE SEC- 
OND CATEGORY OF SMALL-SCALE MINES IS GENERALLY 
EXPORTED. THE SIZE AND CHARACTER OF SMALL-SCALE 
MINING OF THIS TYPE HAS OFTEN MADE WHAT LAWS THERE 
ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO APPLY OR HAS HIGHLIGHTED THEIR 
INADEQUACY. 
5 
Although there are many definitions of "small-scale mining", allu- 
vial diamond mining clearly falls into the second ILO category. 
Its unique characteristics appear to make "what laws there are 
impossible to apply or has highlighted their inadequacy". Alluvial 
diamond mining is actually a sub-set of the ILO's "small-scale" 
mining definition. The most appropriate term for this is artisanal 
mining. Again, there is a multitude of interpretations for what 
this means, but it is not an issue that requires much explanation. 
As defined by the Government of South Africa, "Artisanal mining 
means small-scale mining involving the extraction of minerals 
with the simplest of tools, on a subsistence level".6 Artisanal 
mining of diamonds in Africa is carried out by people working 
with simple tools and equipment, usually in the informal sector, 
outside much of the legal and regulatory framework. The vast 
majority of the diggers are very poor, exploiting marginal deposits 
in harsh and sometimes dangerous conditions - and having 
considerable negative impact on the environment. To a large extent, 
artisanal diamond mining is a livelihood strategy adopted pri- 
marily by rural and small village populations for whom it appears 
to be the most promising income opportunity. 
The activities of miners in this sector are often viewed negatively 
by governments, large companies and environmentalists. 
Concerns range from the use of child labour and the potential 
for environmental damage to the use of mine revenue to 
finance conflict. 
At the extreme, governments consider the sector illegal and 
attempt to ban it through different means. In many cases, they 
simply neglect it, thereby allowing negative social and environ- 
mental impacts to be aggravated. There are no cases in Africa 
where artisanal diamond mining has been supported and reg- 
ulated successfully, although South Africa is the most positive case, 
primarily because the majority of alluvial diamonds are mined 
on private property which can be policed, and where miners 
can be paid a wage. 
The relationship between large companies and miners is poorly 
understood and is often troubled, characterized by mutual mistrust 
and sometimes conflict. Large companies usually consider small- 
scale miners as "trespassers", while miners often regard the grant- 
ing of concessions to large companies as depriving them of their 
land and livelihoods.? 
The contribution of artisanal diamond mining to income generation, 
employment, gross omestic pro uct, export earnings and tax 
revenues varies dramatically from country to country. In Sierra Leone 
and the DRC it is important, for oil-rich Angola it is less important, 
and for South Africa it is insignificant. Sierra Leone's mineral 
economy is currently a "one-crop" economy and the "crop" is 
diamonds. Although there are other minerals mined in Sierra Leone, 
the diamond sector provides more jobs than any other after 
subsistence agriculture and is the largest contributor to GDP 
and export earnings. 
i 
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EVERYTHING SAID ABOUT THE GENERAL UASt rUI1 ANU 
AGAINST ARTISANAL MINING, AND MORE, CAN BE SAID 
ABOUT ARTISANAL DIAMOND MINING IN SIERRA LEONE. THE 
COUNTRY HAS A LONG HISTORY OF DIAMONDS, AND THE REV- 
ENUE THEY GENERATED WAS ONCE THE MAINSTAY OF THE 
ECONOMY. HOWEVER, FROM THE EARLY 1970S ONWARD THE 
SECTOR BECAME INCREASINGLY DYSFUNCTIONAL, DOMINAT- 
ED BY CORRUPT PRACTICES AND BAD POLICY. BY THE 1990S, 
THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY HAD NOT ONLY CEASED TO SERVE 
THE NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY, IT HAD BECOME A MOTOR FOR 
DESTABILIZATION AND COLLAPSE INTO CIVIL WAR. DURING 
THIS TEN-YEAR WAR, DIAMONDS CONTRIBUTED VIRTUALLY 
NOTHING TO THE ECONOMY OR TO SOCIETY IN GENERAL. 
RATHER, DIAMONDS HAD THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF SUPPORT- 
ING AND PROLONGING THE REBEL WAR.8 
Today, diamond mining once again makes a significant contri- 
bution to the economy, providing work for more people than 
any sector after subsistence farming. Although an estimated 
120,000 people work as artisanal diamond miners, local pop- 
ulations have benefited little from diamonds mined in their 
area. Diggers share in the value of diamonds mined, but rarely 
receive a salary, and most average incomes of little more than 
a dollar a day. This is an informal economy, controlled by a 
small group of people who reap the real economic rewards. 
Any critical analysis of the present economic and social structure 
of the artisanal diamond sector has to be tempered by the 
realization that the war in Sierra Leone ended only in 2002. 
For much of the previous decade, Sierra Leone was essentially a 
"failed state", with little or no influence on the diamond sector. 
Towns Major Roads Rivers ® Diamonds Alluvial Diamonds 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ARTISANAL MINING 
TO THE ECONOMY OF SIERRA LEONE 
Sierra Leone's diamonds are of a consistently high quality, with an 
average run-of-mine carat value that is higher than almost any other 
diamond producing country in the world. Artisanal diamond 
mining today makes a significant contribution to the general econ- 
omy of Sierra Leone. It provides work for more people than any 
sector after subsistence farming, and is the country's major source 
of foreign exchange. A 2001 study estimated that by 2006, 
Sierra Leone would produce 750,000 to 1 million carats of 
diamonds a year, with exports rising from around $5o million 
in 2002 to as much as $18o million by zoo6.9 The country is 
already half way there. In 2003, Sierra Leone mined and legally 
exported approximately $76 million of diamonds from the alluvial 
fields. In 2004 the total may reach $120 million. 
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AVERAGE PRICE PER CARAT 
2003 2004 2003 2004 
6,723,551 37,853 55,347 121.84 121.48 
February 7,087,005 9,956,715 40,612 67,192 174,50 148.18 ..............:...........................:............................. .........................:............................. 
March 4,827,357 12,186,651 29,566 61,730 
Interestingly, only ten per cent of the exports in the first six months 
of 2004 resulted from the start-up in November 2003 of 
industrial kimberlite mining in Kono District. The vast majority of 
diamond miners are in the artisanal sector- mining without much 
more than hand-held tools, shovels and sieves. They operate 
largely informally, are not regulated and have no written agreements 
with their employers. It has been estimated that there are between 
150,000 and 200,000 artisanal diamond miners, although 
calculations below suggest that the actual number may be closer 
to 120,000. 
The government charges fees for mining licences, dealers and 
dealers' agents, and exporters. As well, it collects a three per cent 
tax on all diamonds exported. This tax is levied on the exporter, 
who also pays US$40,000 for an annual export licence or $20,000 
for half a year. 
ESTIMATED GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
FROM THE DIAMOND SECTOR IN 2004" 
(US DOLLARS) 
Three per cent export tax $2,253,365 
Exporters licence fees (estimate) $1,315,800 
Dealers licence fees (estimate) $337,500 
Licence Holders fees (estimate) $759,000 
Agents Licence fees (estimate) $524,000 
Total $5,189,665 
Additional revenues are generated from company royalties, 
exploration fees and surface rents paid to chiefdoms. These figures 
are somewhat misleading, however. While a small amount of the 
163.27 197.42 
revenue is available for general government expenditure, a large 
part of it is devoted to the regulation and management of the 
licensing system, to fees for independent external valuators and 
to maintain Kimberley Process minimum standards. 
For example, the three per cent export tax is divided as follows:'2 
Development Area Community 
Development Fund 0.75% US$569,773 
Valuation Fee 0.75% $569,773 
Individual Valuation Fee 0.40% $303,879 
Monitoring Fee 0.35% $240,167 
To general revenue 0.75% $569,773 
Total 3.00% $2,253,365 
. L. ! (; T E H Vii'v' i; !_1 ft 
The value of official exports would be much higher were it not for 
smuggling. Unofficial government estimates place the level of 
smuggling at 5o per cent, and one recent study suggests that it 
is much higher.'; In addition to diamonds being smuggled out, dia- 
monds are also smuggled in from Guinea, Liberia and farther afield. 
The structure of the alluvial diamond trade in Sierra Leone is 
particularly complex, as reflected in the number of players, tiers 
and government processes, which involve traditional authorities, 
local governments and the central government. On the surface, 
the artisanal diamond sector looks as though it is fully located 
within the formal legitimized Sierra Leone economy. Licence 
holders formally apply through a defined government system, 
which includes traditional authorities, local government and the 
state. Sizes of digging sites and the number of miners on a site 
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are specified by the government, and superficially it appears as 
though licence holders sell their diamonds in an open and 
competitive market. 
The truth is, however, that large parts of the industry are informal 
and are, for all practical purposes, monopolized by a relatively small 
group of people who dictate the price of rough diamonds, reap 
most of the economic rewards and exploit those in the production 
chain below them. The reasons can be found in the lack of market 
knowledge among diggers and miners, limited access to capital, 
corruption and the ineffective application of corrective policies. 
si R 
In 2003, the Mines Policy of 1998 was amended to create an 
incentive scheme for good performance among what are called 
"foreign nationals": a tax break of o.5o per cent on all exports 
over $io million. Hisham Mackie, the country's biggest exporter, 
was the only one to benefit from this scheme, which meant 
that he saved $90,000, a figure he matched again in the first 
half of 2004 alone. A similar tax break is offered to "indigenous 
citizens" exporting more than $I million worth of diamonds. 
Five individuals or companies reached this plateau in 2003. This 
policy may be positive and necessary in order to curb smuggling, 
but it also contradicts one of the most important principles of 
modern taxation systems, making the tax regressive instead of 
progressive.'4 
The Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) was 
established in 2001 as part of a broader reform of the diamond 
industry following the end of the war. Of the three per cent export 
tax, one quarter is returned to diamond mining communities. 
In zoos the amount returned to these communities was 
US$195,165; in 2002 it was US$312,988; and in 2003 it was 
$569,000. In 2004 it is expected to reach $900,000, The purpose 
of the fund is to give mining communities a stake in ensuring 
that diamonds mined in their areas are exported legally, and to 
return some of the proceeds to the community as a whole. 
The amount is tied to the number of diamond licences issued in 
a given Chiefdom and to the value of diamonds mined. The DACDF 
is normally managed by a Chiefdom Development Committee 
(CDC) reflecting all sectors of the community: youth, women, 
elders and the Paramount Chief. 
The government states that the fund: 
The impact of the DACDF has been mixed, although the new 
levels of remittance to mining chiefdoms is revolutionary.'5 Positive 
uses of the fund have been documented (e.g. the construction 
of a multi-purpose community complex in the Lower Bambara 
Chiefdom of Kenema District). There are also cases where serious 
friction has developed over who will manage the fund at the local 
level, where projects should be located and what type of projects 
should be implemented. CDC members are hand picked by Chiefs, 
who therefore have tremendous influence over them. Some 
Chiefdoms, particularly in urban settlements, have failed to 
properly account for the money received. 
A bill before parliament in the latter half of 2004 was expected to 
allocate 20 per cent of the DACDF funds to the hitherto largely 
unfunded district councils in the diamond areas, something that 
would give them, too, a stake in legitimate and licensed mining. 
Sel:tai L,irrsIt t iIiq 'U nit 
In 1996 the Ministry of Mineral Resources established a min- 
eral sector monitoring unit, responsible for all mining, including 
diamonds. The aim is to ensure that all mining is licensed, that laws 
and regulations such as those relating to the environment and 
child labour are observed, and that diamonds are not smuggled 
out of the country. Mines Monitoring Officers (MMOs) monitor 
and evaluate the performance of diamond diggers, licence 
holders, dealers and exporters regarding the buying and selling 
of diamonds, licensing and adherence to all legislation and regula- 
tions pertaining to the industry. 
The monitoring system appears to be largely ineffective, as 
reflected in the large estimates of smuggling and the continuing 
violation of regulations. The major problem is that the government 
has little capacity to support the monitoring system. MMOs 
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are required to travel to mines for monitoring purposes, many of 
which are far from the towns where they reside, but few have 
transportation. Although USAID provided MMOs in Kono District 
with 1o motorcycles in 2004, these had to be shared among 
6o men who, in that district alone, were responsible for reg- 
ulating i ioo licences, 6o trading offices, and one kimberlite 
mining company. MMOs are not classified as civil servants and 
receive no civil service benefits. Their annual salary is US$511 
or approximately US$43 per month, and no other benefits. 
This represents less than $2 a day and is a quarter of what the 
average NGO worker in the diamond districts earns. The low salary 
and inadequate support, combined with the task of monitoring 
the flow of millions of dollars worth of diamonds, sets them up 
as targets, both for bribes and for failure. 
Child miners 
There are also Mine Wardens in all diamond regions. Unlike MMOs, 
they are government employees. Mine Wardens survey and demarcate 
mining plots and are involved in the licence application process, 
primarily by recommending licence applicants to Chiefdom 
Committees. On the advice of the Committees, the Ministry of 
Mineral Resources then issues licences through the resident Mines 
Warden. Mine Wardens also have the power to arrest and, through 
the office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of justice, to 
help prosecute illicit miners and dealers. 
The Chiefdom Committees play an important role in the artisanal 
diamond sector. They are charged with the responsibility of super- 
vising all mining activities in the Chiefdom. The responsibilities 
of these committees include the identification of diamond plots, 
overseeing the acquisition of licences and extraction of diamonds 
as well as overseeing the buying and selling of diamonds. 
The Paramount Chief chairs the Committee. 
newards 
As part of the monitoring policy, mine monitors and others are 
offered a reward for information leading to the successful prose- 
cution of smugglers. The reward is 40 per cent of the value of any 
diamonds confiscated. There have been few recent claimants, 
however, suggesting that smugglers have become more 
sophisticated, or that smuggling has decreased considerably. 
Both may well be true. Certainly there have been huge increases 
in the official (i.e. legal) export of diamonds in the past three 
years, and the average carat value of diamonds also increased 
during 2004, which means that more valuable stones are now 
being exported legally. In one well-known case, however, MMOs 
in Kenema have been waiting for their reward for two years, 
a demonstration to others that virtue itself is its only reward. 
Examples like this work directly against honesty among MMOs. 
THE REALM: PO\ERTY DIAMONDS 
The Sierra Leone diamond economy can be thought of as a 
"casino economy" for many of the people who work in it. This is 
particularly true for diggers and licence holders. Most are 
gambling on finding a large diamond. In fact, both diggers and 
licence holders refer to the money they earn as "winnings" 
rather than salaries or profits, and the diggers appear to prefer a 
system of payment in which they receive little or no wages, but 
share in the value of the diamonds they mine. 
MINERS/DIGGERS 
The individuals who mine diamonds are unskilled labourers 
working, in most cases, with nothing more than a shovel or a sieve. 
Diggers normally work six days a week from 8:oo am until 
5:00 pm, with a 30 minute lunch break. There are several methods 
by which diggers are paid, all decided by the licence holder who 
hires them. 
Casino System: Interviews for this report found that licence 
holders who prefer this system normally pay diggers between 
Leiooo and LeiSoo (US 39-59 cents) per day and provide 
them with two cups of rice each day for lunch. The diggers on 
a given plot will also collectively share 30 per cent of the value 
of any diamonds mined. If 5o diggers work on a plot, each would 
receive 1/50th of 30 per cent of the value of the diamonds 
produced. Or the share may be decided arbitrarily by the gang 
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leader. Diggers working under this system are gamblers. They 
work for very little money and bet on both a high return and an 
honest licence holder. 
Pay Per Win System: In some cases, diggers will negotiate the 
price of the diamonds they find, although this requires some 
knowledge of diamond values, which few have in any great detail. 
Daily Wage: Licence holders who employ diggers under this 
kind of arrangement usually pay a daily wage of approximately 
LeSooo (US$2) per day, plus some rice for lunch. For a 25-day 
working month a digger would earn about US$5o.o0. Diggers 
receive no share in the diamond proceeds. Under this system, 
diggers are more likely to steal diamonds, as they have no stake 
in what they turn in. 
Pile System: There are variations, but generally all diamond- 
bearing earth and gravel is separated into three piles, each 
"belonging" to one of three groups involved in the operation: 
diggers, the licence holder and their supporter. Any diamonds 
found belong to the person in whose pile they are found. 
Although there are variations, and several systems may work at 
once, even at the same site, historically, most diggers have pre- 
ferred the casino system, "betting" on a share of the "winnings". 
Being a digger, however, is not entirely a gamble. Monitoring 
the diggers is difficult and many undoubtedly steal diamonds and 
sell them independently if they can. 
The Peace Diamond Alliance (PDA) is a USAID-funded initiative, 
registered in Sierra Leone as a community-based organization. 
In 2003, the PDA gathered data on what diggers earn.' 
6 
Researching three plots and 89 diggers in some depth, they 
calculated that each one earned between Le3152 (US$1.24) 
and Le37o5 (US$1.46) per day, based on the casino system. 
Monthly pay is difficult to calculate because not every digger 
works full time. If one assumes an average working month of 
20 days, the monthly pay for these men would be between 
$25 and $30, considerably less than Sierra Leone's minimum 
wage of Leloo,ooo (US$40). The PDA concluded, however, 
that the imposition of a statutory minimum wage for diggers 
would "place an extreme burden on mine owners". PDA has the 
following elements in its Code of Conduct, regarding Conditions 
of Service for diggers: 
In a casino system, diggers should receive three cups of rice 
per day plus Le700 (US 27 cents) or Le15oo (US 59 cents). 
The diggers' share of diamond revenue should be 30 per cent; 
In a contract mining situation, pay should be at least LeSooo 
(US$1.97) per worker per day plus lunch; 
First-aid and medical treatment should be provided for all 
mine-related injuries and sickness; 
Housing should be provided at the mine site. 
While not exactly a bonanza, these provisions, if applied, would 
represent a significant change for most diggers. 
The figures above provide the basis for a calculation of the 
number of diggers in Sierra Leone in 2003. Assuming each 
IN THE PROCESS OF RESEARCHING THIS PAPER, AM I NE WAS VISITED IN A RURAL AREA CLOSE 
TO KO I DU. THERE WERE TEN MINERS 
WASHING TAILINGS IN A RIVER. THE TAILINGS WERE FROM AN AREA THAT HAD 
PREVIOUSLY BEEN MINED BY REVOLUTIONARY 
UNITED FRONT REBELS. THE MINERS WERE ALL FROM A NEARBY VILLAGE. WHEN 
ASKED FOR AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LICENCE 
HOLDER, THERE WAS SILENCE AND NERVOUS GLANCES. THE QUESTION WAS REPEATED 
SEVERAL TIMES AND THEN ONE OF THE 
MINERS SAID THERE WAS NO LICENCE HOLDER AND NO LICENCE FOR THEIR ACTIVITY. 
THE MINING WAS A COMMUNAL VILLAGE 
ACTIVITY THAT HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR 18 MONTHS. THE MEN SAID THEY HAD FOUND 
NO DIAMONDS DURING THAT PERIOD. WHEN 
ASKED IF A MINES MONITORING OFFICER (MMO) HAD BEEN AROUND TO CHECK FOR 
A LICENCE, THEY REPLIED THAT ONE CAME 
AROUND EVERY WEEK OR TWO BUTTHATTHEY HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH HIM, AND THEY 
HAD NEVER PAID ANY FINES OR BRIBES. 
IT WAS LATER EXPLAINED THAT IN SUCH CASES, THE VILLAGE CHIEF WOULD OFTEN 
PROVIDETHE MMO WITH LAND FOR A FARM. 
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16. Miner starts mining 
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digger averaged $36o a year in diamond income ($3o a month), 
based on total exports of $76 million, the number of diggers 
would have been about 63,000. If the official export figure 
represented half of the actual mining (the rest being smuggled 
out), the number would be more like izo,ooo diggers. (This 
number would change with every change in assumption made 
about the average digger's work-year and earnings.'7) 
By far the majority of the diggers are Sierra Leoneans, many of 
whom have migrated to the diamond fields from other parts 
of the country. Although life is tough and risky for diggers, there 
is no difficulty in attracting them because of the lack of other 
viable economic alternatives, and because diamonds in Sierra 
Leone - as elsewhere in the world - are commonly associated 
with the possibility of striking it rich. 
Digging diamonds is hard work and therefore it is a vocation for 
relatively young men. Many diggers, particularly single men, 
view mining diamonds as a full-time job. During visits to mines 
in connection with this report, the only women observed were 
those who cooked and brought food to the miners. Women are 
known, however, to work in all aspects of diamond mining, 
from digging and washing gravel, to acting as supporters and 
licence holders. There were very few diggers who appeared to 
be less than 17 or 18 years of age. Informants said, however, 
that mines less accessible to MMOs employ more children. 
One licence holder said that his mine had been closed for a week 
because he had children working. This suggests that where MMOs 
have access, regulations are being enforced. 
A 2002 study by World Vision surveyed 5oo child miners in Kono 
District and noted that the children "usually got involved in 
mining at an early age; initially on a part-time basis, but they 
eventually became fully engrossed into it, thereby interfering 
with their education or any other option that promises a better 
future." There were, the report noted, "those who were doing 
well in school but had to abandon their educational pursuit to fol- 
low their peers who transiently became rich and admirable." 
Eighty three per cent of those surveyed said they were directly 
involved in mining activities, and 8.6 per cent said they "went 
to the mining sites to prepare food for the miners but they spent 
all the day at the mining sites." Seventy-five per cent of those 
surveyed said they chose mining all on their own "to get money," 
while 15.2 per cent claimed they were engaged in mining because 
they had no alternative. A further 6.2 per cent claimed they were 
influenced into joining by their friends, and four per cent said they 
were sent into mining by their parents. 
In addition to hard work, the life of a diamond digger is one of 
exploitation. Written contracts and terms and conditions of work 
are non-existent, child labour laws are not enforced, health and 
safety regulations are either non existent or are ignored. Miners 
have no "right" to negotiate payment or conditions of work. The 
United Mines Workers Union has traditionally shied away from the 
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artisanal diamond sector, but is presently making some interven- 
tions, and has registered approximately 500 diggers. It remains to 
be seen whether it will be able to develop the kind of influence 
that would be required to change the prevailing situation. 
Licence holders - those who organize and manage the mining 
of diamonds - apply through traditional authorities to the govern- 
ment for a mining licence. The process of obtaining a licence 
is long and expensive, requiring a series of bribes along the way. 
It was stated in one interview that the "real" cost of a licence 
is easily three times the official government fee. 
Many licence holders do not have the money to purchase a licence. 
They receive up-front funds - a loan - from individuals known 
as "supporters". Supporters often provide funding for the licence 
fee, labour, equipment and any other operating costs. Licence 
holders manage the diamond plot, supervise the mining and pay 
the diggers. In return they generally receive one-third of the value 
of diamonds. They sell to dealers who are normally businessmen 
or women in surrounding communities. In most cases the dealer 
is also the supporter. The licence holder is in a vulnerable position 
for several reasons. Most have little knowledge of the value of 
rough diamonds. The supporter dictates the price, and deducts 
from it any up-front loans. This system guarantees that there 
will be no serious competition, and few situations where a licence 
SUMVUFiLKS ANU ULALLFiS 
"Supporters" are the financial backers for most artisanal diamond 
mining. They are generally businessmen living in the diamond 
areas, and by far the majority are also dealers, or diamond buyers 
and sellers. For example, in Kenema District, Ministry officials 
report there are no supporters who are not also diamond dealers. 
There are no legal agreements defining the conditions of a sup- 
porter's investment, however the licence holder has an informal 
obligation to sell his diamonds to his supporter. 
The majority of dealers are resident in the diamond cities of Bo, 
Kenema and Koidu. Dealers buy diamonds from licence holders 
and sell to exporters. In mid-2004 there were 135 diamond 
dealers licensed in Sierra Leone. Most were "foreign nationals", 
a vague distinction in Sierra Leone, where there are thousands 
of second and third generation Lebanese families, many engaged 
in the diamond business and many with Sierra Leonean citizenship. 
For example in August 2003 in Kenema Town there were 
66 dealers. Of this number six were what is called "indigenous 
citizens". Others were from neighbouring ECOWAS countries, 
especially Guinea, Senegal, Mali and Ghana. A very large pro- 
portion was of Lebanese extraction. Most own retail businesses 
and use those premises to conduct their diamond business. It is 
not too strong to say that the Lebanese community in Sierra Leone 
controls a large part of the diamond business.s 
Dealers' licence fees vary in cost depending on citizenship. As of 
2004, citizens of Sierra Leone pay US$19oo, ECOWAS citizens 
DIGGERS WORKING UNDER THIS SYSTEM ARE GAMBLERS. 
THEY WORK FOR VERY LITTLE MONEY AND BET ON BOTH 
A HIGH RETURN AND AN HONEST LICENCE HOLDER. 
holder can sell diamonds to the highest bidder. It also encourages 
licence holders to sell their diamonds secretly to unlicensed 
itinerant dealers who may be prepared to offer a higher price and 
who will likely smuggle the diamonds out of the country. 
In December 2002, there were 1,272 valid artisanal mining 
licences. By June 2004, the number had risen dramatically to 
2,318. The official cost of a licence is US$253. Only Sierra Leoneans 
may hold licences, however it is not uncommon for citizens to hold 
licences as proxies for non-citizens. 
pay US$24oo and other non-citizens pay US$4000. In 2002-2003 
there were 131 licensed diamond dealers in Sierra Leone. Of these, 
93 were "citizens" (although not necessarily native Sierra Leoneans), 
18 were non-citizens and 20 were ECOWAS nationals. The dealers 
also have "agents" working for them. Their job is to purchase 
diamonds at mine sites on behalf of the dealers. The agents pay 
a licence fee of $8oo and by law no dealer can have more than 
five agents working for him. With 131 dealers in operation, there 
could be as many as 655 agents in the field. 
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A diamond dealer is the classic middleman, and is well placed to 
exploit those below him in the mining chain. Dealers represent the 
first real expertise in valuation in the diamond chain, allowing 
them to pay grossly undervalued prices for the gems, while in 
turn demanding a reasonable market price from the exporter. And 
because dealers are usually also "supporters", they have an 
additional grip on the holder of the mining licence. 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE FREE-FOR-41-1 
The 2004 Sierra Leone Annual Diamond Review calls diamond min- 
ing in Sierra Leone an "Environmentalist's Nightmare".'9 For small 
scale and industrial licences, the Mines and Minerals Act of 
1994 states: 
CI DING 
STER OF MIN 
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EXPORTERS 
The 2003 Annual Report published by the Government Gold and 
Diamond Office (GGDO) lists 43 licensed exporters. Of the 43, 
five are described as "foreign nationals". These five foreign nation- 
als accounted for 74 per cent of all diamonds officially exported 
from Sierra Leone in 2003 at a value of US$56.2 million. The 38 
other exporters, classified as "indigenous citizens", exported 
the remaining z6 per cent, with a total value of US$19.7 million. 
This demonstrates the economic power of a handful of foreign 
nationals. 
In both 2002 and 2003 the GGDO issued two types of export 
licence, one for a higher fee to foreign nationals and one with 
a lower fee for indigenous citizens. However, the GGDO admits 
what is common knowledge in Sierra Leone, that some Sierra 
Leoneans have abused the policy by acting as fronts for foreign 
nationals who in reality held the licence. While the GGDO states 
that, "...this was tantamount to defrauding the state and could 
rob the genuine citizens of the opportunity of participation..." 
there have been no prosecutions for this. In 2004, the export 
licence fee was changed to a flat rate for everyone (USS40,000).* 
As noted above, however, foreign nationals receive a o.5 per cent 
tax break on exports of more than $1o million, a rate which 
applies to exports of more than Si million by indigenous citizens. 
THE MINISTER SHALL REQUIRE ENVIRt 
LEASE EXCEPT 
LEASES FOR BUILDING AND INDUSTRIAL 
More recent policy is found in the 2003 Core Mineral Policy, 
which is more explicit. The problem is implementation, however, 
especially in the case of artisanal miners whose operations, although 
small, are often chaotic. By law, the size of an artisanal mining 
plot cannot exceed 210 feet by 210 feet. In fact, mines often 
comprise a number of plots, which can cover as much as 5 and even 
25 acres. These pose a substantial challenge where the envi- 
ronment is concerned. Government regulations do stipulate 
that an artisanal mining licence holder must pay approximately 
US$5o per year for environmental rehabilitation, but this amount 
is obviously too small to be meaningful and the funds derived 
from this part of the licence fee are largely inaccessible. 
The government's new Core Mineral Policy aims to improve 
public knowledge of the environmental consequences of mining. 
It aims to improve, monitor and enforce laws and regulations 
on the closure, reclamation and rehabilitation of mines, and it aims 
to enforce the requirements for environmental impact assessments. 
Most importantly, it aims to strengthen the Environmental 
Monitoring Unit at the Ministry of Mineral Resources. These 
are excellent intentions; the proof of their usefulness will lie in the 
effectiveness of their application. The major difficulty is not 
with the policies and regulations, it is with the lack of capacity 
and resources of the government to force compliance. 
* Ten of the 43 exporters in zoo3 had exports that were less than the cost of the 2004 export licence. As a result, many licences were not renewed. 
PRESCRIBED AS A 
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CASE STUDY: ANGOLA 
INTRODUCTION 
PRIOR TO 2004 AND THE FORCED EXPULSION OF CONGOLESE 
MINERS, UP TO 400,000 ARTISANAL MINERS WORKED IN 
ANGOLA, PRODUCING OVER ONE THIRD OF THE COUNTRY'S 
OFFICIAL DIAMOND OUTPUT. IN THE PROCESS, LOCAL POPU- 
LATIONS HAVE BEEN MARGINALIZED, EXCLUDED FROM MINING 
IN THEIR OWN AREAS, BENEFITING "?,OM THE DIAMONDS 
MINED. LICENSING AND OTHER ONS EXIST BUT IN 
PRACTICE THEY ARE UNENFORCE SIMPLY IGNORED. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE DIAMOND PIPELINE FROM MINE TO 
EXPORT, AND THE WAY IT IS SUPPORTED BY BUYERS, HAS 
CREATED A PARALLEL, HIGHLY EXPLOITATIVE AND SKEWED 
ECONOMY IN DIAMOND MINING AREAS. 
A gorimpeiro - a small-scale or artisanal diamond miner; literally, 
a prospector - is someone who searches for diamonds outside the 
formal sector. Artisan or garimpeiro mining was not the chief source 
of Angolan diamond production until the beginning of the 199os. 
In practice, much of the artisanal production in Angola today 
is not actually artisanal; it is semi-industrial, carried out using small 
boats and diving equipment. 
At present, this sector produces just over one third of Angola's 
official diamond output. ASCorp, Angola's monopoly diamond 
buying company (until it was replaced in 2004 by the state-owned 
SODIAM) bought diamonds worth $252 million from this sector 
in 2003. Garimpo mining has also been the vector for diamond 
smuggling. There are no current estimates of this, but diamond 
market sources believe that Angola has been producing in the 
region of US $1 billion per year since the mid 199os. This figure 
is likely declining because of the exhaustion of alluvial reserves 
due to years of uncontrolled digging. It will fall even further if 
the government is not able to control the sector. 
This form of uncontrolled mining expanded because of the 
destruction and closure of the formal sector due to war, a loss 
of the mining areas to UNITA - which brought in many of the 
illegal miners to work in their own mines - and to the gov- 
ernment's inability to enforce administrative controls in its own 
areas. Several attempts have been made to push out illegal miners 
s National --- Provincial - International Primary Secondary 
Capital Boundaries Boundaries Deposits Deposits 
and buyers - Operations Cancer I, II and III were attempts in 
1995-6 - but the miners returned. 
Although garimpeiro activities existed in the 198os, illicit mining 
was on a very much smaller scale, probably worth less than 
$loo million a year, including UNITA's smuggling. 1991 saw 
the beginning of large scale activities. That year, artisanal mining 
and the possession of diamonds by Angolan nationals was legalised. 
As a result, there was a major influx of at least 50,000 illegal 
miners into the Lunda diamond provinces, with about $5oo 
million worth of Angolan diamonds flooding the open markets. 
Under the old law, which is to be changed by the end of 2004, 
there is a framework for artisanal mining under licence in special 
protected zones, allowing access to deposits that are not 
commercially viable for industrial-scale companies. Licences are 
awarded by the state diamond company, Endiama. Mining com- 
panies are legally responsible for "policing" the artisans who work 
on the edge of their concessions, and for moving illegal miners 
out of their concession areas. If captured, they are handed 
over to the National Police. 
In principle, only local residents who have lived in the diamond 
areas for five years have the right to become artisanal miners. 
A licence gives them the right to work in groups of up to five 
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people, although only a tiny proportion of the garimpeiros in 
Angola are actually licensed. Because of the war, UNITA's 
large-scale smuggling operations, and the presence in some 
remote areas of Angolan nationals with no identity papers, these 
provisions have remained largely unenforceable, even today. 
This legal schematic will remain the basis of artisanal mining 
under the new law, with miners working on the edge of company 
concessions. There are other areas in Angola which will always 
be uneconomic for companies to mine and these may well be 
liberalized for artisanal mining as well. However, it is envisaged 
that there will be only small numbers of licensed artisanal miners, 
and that some will be employed by mining companies. As of 
mid 2004, SODIAM said that it was buying approximately 
$lo million from gorimpeiros and that this was expected to 
double when regional buying centres were opened, although 
the details of purchasing arrangements remain unclear. 
UNITA's operations had the most decisive effect in increasing 
illegal mining and smuggling in Angola. UNITA's seizure of the 
diamond fields in late 1992 brought the single largest influx of 
illicit miners into Angola. By the mid 199os there were about 
300,000 miners, including dependants, in the Cuango region 
alone, as UNITA expanded its mining operations. The local Tsokwe 
people were largely excluded from UNITA's mining, which was 
operated by Belgian and South African businessmen using the 
Congolese workforce. The mining operations were a mixture 
of artisanal digging on an enormous scale - one very profitable 
UNITA mine had 37,000 diggers - semi-industrial digging and 
diving, and industrial operations using captured mining equipment. 
mines across the centre and south of Angola, or remaining to mine 
in the Cuango. This situation continued until the end of the war 
in 2002. Their affiliations and the effects on local villages of UNITAs 
occupation of the area may go some way to explaining the bad 
feeling that has been demonstrated against the Congolese. 
To finance its military operations, UNITA ran the world's largest 
organised diamond smuggling operation until the war ended. 
In July 1998, the United Nations Security Council placed an 
embargo on the import into markets of any diamonds exported 
from Angola without a certificate of origin. Although aimed at 
cutting UNITAs financial lifelines, the embargo also placed require- 
ments on the government to control diamond smuggling and 
tighten up its certificate of origin system. In government-controlled 
areas in the eastern Lundas, the situation was and remains 
somewhat different, with foreign miners more integrated into 
local structures. There were, and are, Angolan artisanal miners 
in these regions, a small proportion with mining licences issued 
by the government. Congolese miners work in these areas as well, 
but as foreign nationals they cannot get licences except in partner- 
ship with Angolans. 
LAND USE AND ACCESS: 
SPECIAL REGIMES FOR THE LUNPAS 
The right to inhabit, and the movement of people and goods 
through the Lunda Provinces and other mining regions are gov- 
erned at present by both the Diamond Law and by Law 17/94 
- the Special Regime for the Diamondiferous Mineral Reserve 
Zones. In principle, this prevents migration into the region 
and recognizes the rights of existing populations. There are three 
types of zone: 
MORE THAN HALF OF ALL THE DIAMONDS MINED I N ANGOLA 
I N THE LAST TWELVE YEARS HAVE BEEN SMUGGLED OUT - 
WORTH A TOTAL OF PERHAPS $5 BILLION. 
UNITA controlled the borders; miners entered only by buying a 
licence from UNITA for a pass, called "o guia", which permitted 
travel to work in a named mine. Although about 15,000 miners 
left in 1997, the majority stayed, working for UNITA on other 
Restricted Zones are active mining areas to which there are 
no rights of access and no rights of passage. Neither people 
nor goods may enter these zones without permission of the 
concession holder; 
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Protected Zones are mining concessions and exclude any rights 
of entry or residence, unless part of the area is identified as 
an artisanal mining zone. Rights of transit on established roads 
exist; merchandise - though not diamonds - can circulate; 
Reserve Zones are those areas where diamond deposits have 
been identified as suitable for prospecting or development on 
an industrial scale. All mineral and mining rights are reserved 
to the state until awarded to a licence holder. The law restricts 
entry, movement, residence and economic activities other than 
subsistence agriculture. 
The reserve zones are governed by law 17/94, and include all the 
territories of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul which are not either 
restricted or protected zones. Entry to the Lundas is, in principle, 
prohibited without what is, effectively, a visa. Only those Angolan 
nationals who had lived in these regions for five years or more had 
an automatic right to continue; others were expected to make 
a case, based on their activities. While subsistence farming and 
fishing is allowed, all other forms of economic activity have to 
be authorised by the provincial governor. These regulations have, 
for all intents and purposes, been unenforceable. 
Digging by the local population is illegal without a permit in areas 
identified as artisanal zones. This law has, as with many others, 
been completely ignored. It has been unenforceable except in 
those few areas where formal mining has continued or restarted, 
and where illegal miners have been moved out by security forces. 
Local populations may be compulsorily relocated, with com- 
pensation. They must, in principle, be re-housed by the concession 
holder at the same standard, and all social community infra- 
structures, including schools and water supply must be provided 
at the same level. The governor of the province must approve 
any proposed relocation. 
Any discussion of how diamond mining interferes with local people's 
access to land and its use for other purposes than mining is com- 
plicated by the fact that the diamond provinces were effectively 
a war zone between 1992 and 2002. Many villages were 
abandoned as people fled to the slightly safer towns; attacks on 
communities, on roads, the laying of landmines and blowing 
up of bridges in an area which has many rivers all contributed 
to the disruption of the region. Add to that the effects of UNITAs 
military occupation of many areas, and a heavy FAA presence in 
others, plus an army of illegal miners, and any pattern of normal 
rights to land and its use has evaporated. 
Diving platform on an Angolan river 
At the time of writing, there were only eight industrial scale min- 
ing projects operating (but many others were on the cards), and 
all of these had been mining the same concessions for several 
years. Other concessions were suspended or delayed by force 
mojeure in 1998 and are currently in the process of restarting. 
The principal concentration is on prospecting kimberlite pipes, 
given the historical stripping of the alluvial reserves; industrial 
scale alluvial mining is now seen as a short term venture. 
The effects of illicit artisanal mining has been to destroy large 
areas of Angola's alluvial and eluvial deposits (diamond deposits 
in gravels in and around river systems) which would have been 
better suited to industrial scale mining, and which would have 
provided income for the country as well as local employment. 
Large areas of the diamond fields are now depleted and alluvial 
deposits are close to exhaustion. Some geologists in Angola 
believe that many have as little as three to five years of life left 
in them. 
More than half of all the diamonds mined in Angola in the last 
twelve years have been smuggled out - worth a total of perhaps 
$5 billion. The smuggling funded UNITA's war and led to the 
destruction of infrastructure and the further impoverishment of 
displaced peoples. It also led to the ruin of a resource that could 
- at least in theory - have been an engine for longer term 
development. 
THE SITUATION TODAY 
A UN Expert Panel noted that "Crucial to the cross-border 
trade in Angolan diamonds is a group known as the Bana-Lunda, 
young men whose family and kinship ties extend across both 
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countries and who seek their fortune in the diamond fields of 
Angola, in the absence of employment in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo."Z° The Lunda and other Congolese groupings in 
Angola share a common ethnic background with Angolans in the 
north and east of the country, but the Congolese miners are 
perhaps more driven by entrepreneurial spirit and a capacity for 
self-organization. And they did not inherit the Angolan history 
of exclusion from diamond mining, which has meant that Angolan 
gorimpeiros have acquired fewer skills in both mining diamonds 
and trading them. 
Since colonial days, the governments of Angola, Sierra Leone, the 
DRC and others have sought to drive illicit diamond miners away 
from diamond areas by force, usually with little lasting success. 
The latest effort of this type has been the forced expulsion of 
Congolese miners from Angola, beginning in December 2003. 
Accompanied by considerable brutality, Operation Brilhionte 
had expelled as many as 120,000 Congolese and 3,500 West 
Africans by mid 2004. 
Cafunfo, in the Cuango, has had the largest numbers of 
gorimpeiros and is the single most productive area for garimpo 
mining; many of UNITA's diggers remained in this area, working 
for themselves. The area became a major source of ASCorp's 
purchases until it was replaced by SODIAM in 2004. Miners 
in Cafunfo were not expelled, however tensions in the area, as the 
result of police and army operations in February 2004, led to the 
deaths of up to 16 civilians at the hands of the police, and the 
arrest of at least another 64. The incident occurred when the 
town's two diesel-powered generators were seized by the 
police, allegedly to be repaired. Locals feared that the gener- 
ators, the town's only source of electricity, had been sold, and 
they protested. (The generators belonged to Endiama, had been 
captured by UNITA in 1992 and remained in the town)." 
From Cafunfo, and south to Luzamba 5o km away, there were 
(as of April 2004) approximately 70,000 illegal miners working 
on semi-industrial mining operations, diving for diamonds in river 
beds, creating small river diversions and dikes, and pumping these 
out. Deposits in terraces are largely exhausted though years of 
large-scale illegal mining. Sophisticated equipment, including 
diving suits, pumps and dinghies is being used. Illicit miners are 
said to have been moved from the southern areas of the Cuango 
valley, around Za-Muteba, previously a UNITA mining site. 
Artisanal mining continues in other areas previously mined under 
UNITA control, but no estimates of numbers are available. 
MUliA!EUN 
UNICEF estimates that 70 per cent of Angola's population is under 
24, and that 30 per cent of children between the ages of 5 and 
14 years work." Interviews for this report carried out in Lunda Sul 
suggest that because diamond extraction is dangerous and hard, 
it is difficult for children to participate directly in mining. Many 
operations use children mainly for support jobs, such as carrying 
meals for miners. In some areas, however, children are active in 
almost every aspect of diamond extraction activity, except diving. 
Child labour has some of its origins in the war when children 
were forcibly recruited as both soldiers and diamond diggers. 
The preference for children resides in the fact that children are 
less likely to steal and are easier to control. In today's mining 
areas, fear, insecurity and sexual abuse are constant. Today's 
child miners are thus a direct result of war, poverty and the 
absence of education; there are few schools in the diamond regions 
and even the existing ones were destroyed during the many 
decades of war. 
Interviews were conducted for this report with 178 garimpeiros in 
Lunda Norte. While the sample is small and more work needs to 
be done on numbers, the findings are instructive. Ninety per cent 
of the diggers were under 35, and almost half were under 16. 
There was also a significant proportion of women in artisanal 
mining until child-bearing age. 
DISTRIBUTION OF GARIMPEIROS 
IN LUNDA NORTE BY AGE AND SEX 
GENDER 
AGE MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
5-16 49% 41% 46% 
17 -25 21% 10% 17% 
25-35 20% zo% 26% 
35-45 6% 9% 7% 
> 45 4% 4% 4% 
Total ioo% loo% ioo% 
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The interviews provide additional insights: 
Family income: 85 per cent of families derive less than five 
per cent of their income from mining. Among the various 
other income sources reported, the following stand out: 
agriculture (29 per cent), informal trade (21 per cent), small 
businesses and other alternative sources (each 12.5 per cent); 
Hours spent mining: Overall, miners who devote more than 
6 hours a day to mining activities constitute the majority 
(more than 6o per cent); 
Work hazards: 86 per cent of the miners said that the main work 
hazard is the collapse of pits (cave-ins); 
Ethnicity: 93 per cent said that ethnicity has no influence on the 
composition of the work force. Fewer than io per cent of those 
surveyed were natives of the region where they were digging; 
Reasons for operating illegally: Although three quarters of the 
mining sites were leased and licensed, most of the miners at 
work on them were not. Constraints to legal behaviour include 
cost (of licences, bribes), problems in dealing with government 
officials and problems related to legal residence status; 
Buying and Selling Process: The miner is simply a digger and does 
not generally know the true value of a diamond. Diggers may 
arrange to have someone "in the know" help look after their 
interests, but buyers have an effective monopoly and control 
prices. Cheating is rampant. A common split between the 
leaseholder, patrocinador (sponsor or middleman) and digger 
is 25-25-50 respectively, but with prices determined almost 
exclusively between the leaseholder and the patrocinador, 
the digger almost always gets the short end of the stick. 
Diamond mining offers a potential escape from poverty, 
unemployment and subsistence farming, whatever the miner's 
origin or affliation. All search for the big stone that will make 
their fortune, but this form of mining is, in reality, a form of 
semi-slavery - whether the miners dig pits or dive off rickety 
platforms and rubber dinghies into the rivers. If they are lucky, 
or if their patrons are well capitalized, they will have proper 
diving equipment. Otherwise an air hose is all they have as 
they dive to find potholes - "jewel-boxes" - in the rocky river 
beds that might contain diamonds. Or just a handful of gravel. 
There are only two ways to win diamonds from river beds - 
by using divers and by building river diversions and dikes at the 
edge of the rivers, pumping out the water and using either man- 
ual labour or dredges to dig out the diamond bearing gravels. 
The divers are called "plongeurs" and have the highest status 
among the miners; their equipment usually belongs to the 
"patrocinodor". "Mwetistes" keep the dinghy or diving platform 
in place and help the divers bring the bags of gravel on board. 
On the lowest rung of the social ladder is the "lavador", who sifts 
the gravels to separate out the diamonds. Women also do 
this work. 
As in Sierra Leone, Angolan miners are in thrall to the "patroci- 
nador" system - also known as the "supporter" or middleman 
system. The patrocinador funds the mining and buying operations, 
provides mining equipment, and sometimes food, medical supplies 
and other necessities. In return he buys the diamonds, or exchanges 
goods for diamonds. Through this system miners obtain perhaps 
five or ten per cent of the value of the diamonds they dig. They 
may receive $5o for a stone - a price well below market value - 
and then $40 will be deducted as payment for overpriced 
equipment and supplies. It is the local equivalent of the company 
store, ensnaring workers in a permanent debt trap. It is also illegal; 
under Angolan law, each party - the miner and the patrocinador, 
should receive 5o per cent of the value of the diamonds. 
Given reports of up to 400,000 gorimpeiros in Angola prior to 
2004, this division of money means that of the $252 million of 
artisanally-produced diamonds bought by ASCorp in 2003, each 
miner would have received an average annual income of US$351 
if the patrocinodor paid the amounts legally due to them. This would 
equate to about seven carats mined per digger each year, at the 
lowest prices offered by middlemen. The calculation assumes 
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that all the diamonds would have been sold through legal 
channels, although it is likely that smuggling remained high. 
Angola's gross national income per capita is estimated by the 
World Bank to be $650 per capita, a number inflated by the 
country's oil and diamond resources. An estimated 35 per cent of 
the population lives on less than a dollar a day, roughly the cal- 
culation of what the average miner might earn if he was treated 
fairly. In other words, "fair" prices - rarely actually enjoyed by the 
miners - would result in a life of absolute poverty. 
The Patrocinadores 
The Patrocinadores come mainly from West Africa - Senegal, Mali, 
Gambia and Sierra Leone - though there are some Congolese and 
Angolans amongst them. In Angola, unlike other African countries, 
there are relatively few Lebanese patrocinodores. Both the 
Senegalese and Gambians are known to operate family networks 
of buyers and sub-buyers. A larger patrocinador will have a turnover 
of between US$loo,ooo and US$200,000 per month. Although 
the patrocinadores are legally obliged to sell all their diamonds 
to the state-owned SODIAM, in practice they seek the highest 
bidder, and will smuggle diamonds if it is advantageous to do so. 
It is almost certainly the case that some patracinadors never sell 
through formal channels and are affiliated to foreign companies 
who provide the capital. 
A complex set of relationships operates between the patrocinadores, 
the miners, the Sobas (the traditional authorities or chieftains) 
and the military generals, in the eastern Lundas, in particular 
around the Luachimo and Chicapa rivers and their tributaries. 
Estimates in these areas suggest the presence of at least 
70,000 illicit miners in the Lucapa region and a small number - 
approximately 2,000 - of licensed garimpeiro miners. 
Control of mining in this region has been split between these three 
authorities. The generals provide security for the mines; the patroci- 
nadores control the miners - on average between one and two 
thousand men each; and the Sobas allocate men to work in the 
mines, usually in groups of 250. Sobas may have arrangements 
with more than one patrocinador; the reverse also operates - 
patrocinadores may work with more than one Soba. Both generals 
and Sobas receive a percentage from the patrocinador. 
FAA (army) generals also took control of mines in several ex- 
UNITA areas; Cafunfo was one such long established area after 
its recapture from UNITA in 1994. The FAA more recently brought 
in dredges to mine diamonds in the Bie area, as part of their "social 
privileges" according to a press statement made by Endiama. 
The generals have reportedly been warned by the President of 
Angola that they must cease mining activities or face demotion 
to a much lower level. 
The traditional authorities are responsible for identifying those 
legally entitled to mine diamonds on a small scale: long-term 
residents of the region with Angolan nationality. The objective is 
that local people should benefit from this local economic resource, 
but this has not been the case in practice. For the Sobas, how- 
ever, the existing system of integrating foreign miners may mean 
that some of the profits that would otherwise be lost to local 
peoples do trickle back into the community. Miners have little 
say in the system; they depend for their livelihood on patronage. 
The recent expulsion of illicit miners has raised concerns that the 
FAA may also be taking the opportunity to remove local people 
as well as Congolese miners, in order to allow mining companies 
to move into concessions in the newly cleared areas. All rights 
of residence cease to exist when an area becomes a mining 
concession, under the present law but villages should be compen- 
sated for removal and rehoused by concession holders. 
Non-Angolan miners from the DRC and elsewhere have tradition- 
ally brought in their families and work as a family unit, or may have 
married locally, which gives them later rights to citizenship. Such 
settlement can only operate in areas where language and kinship 
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ties exist across the border, making acceptance easier. As a result, 
there tend to be many more garimpeiros in the border areas. 
In other areas, where there are no language or kinship links, the 
miners are easily identified as outsiders, and there can be con- 
siderable resentment. 
Not all Sobas see diamond mining as beneficial for their 
communities. The Forum of Traditional Authorities (FAAT), set up 
in November 2003 to remedy the political isolation of rural chiefs, 
voiced strong criticism both of the exclusion of Sobas from 
government decision making and of the effects of what the 
chairman of FAAT, Mario Katapi, described as the "invasion" of 
the Lunda regions in recent months by West Africans in search 
of diamonds. He warned of the possibility of ethnic conflict, par- 
ticularly in Lunda Sul province13. Katapi was asking for more 
involvement for the Sobas in decision-making relating to rural 
communities, saying political parties ignored the Sobas' knowledge 
of rural peoples and denied them a voice in the political process. 
NO A'_. STRUCTURES 
Alfred Zack Williams has developed a model for artisanal mining 
based on the tributor system - the miners; the supporters - 
patrocinadores or middlemen; and merchant capital - the ultimate 
buyers of the diamonds, who fund the system.14 In Angola the 
patrocinadores themselves may provide the capital for diamond 
purchases and may also fund the market, through the official 
buying system or a smuggling network. 
External capital linked to the unregistered importers of goods and 
merchandise, and to illicit diamond buying, provides an unofficial 
diamond banking system and a means of moving money into the 
mining areas - in a complete money laundering chain that is out- 
side the official system. In this system, money is paid into a foreign 
account and the cash is provided on the ground in the Lundas at 
a substantial discount - between five and ten percent of the 
value of the transaction. The cash can then be used to buy 
diamonds illegally. This is a well established, complete, and 
untraceable system for illicit diamond buying, operating in several 
countries, including the DRC. It is also possible to buy dollars 
on the ground, but probably not in the quantities needed for large 
scale purchases. Smuggled diamonds may achieve profits for 
middlemen of 20 per cent over prices in the ASCorp system. 
Smugglers target better diamonds, do not pay taxes, and trade 
diamonds for goods at skewed prices. 
The overall effect is that artisanal mining operations in the diamond 
regions have their own parallel, highly exploitative and skewed 
economy, in which goods and services cost considerably more 
than in Luanda, regardless of whether diamonds are sold legally 
or are smuggled out. 
EFFECTS ON , iuC \E_ 
It is clear that artisanal mining brings little economic benefit to 
local communities and actually helps increase poverty through 
artificially inflated prices for imported goods. Most of the artisanal 
mining and much of the trading takes place in systems that 
largely exclude local people, whose main means of living is 
subsistence agriculture. 
The Lunda provinces are both economically and legally different 
from the rest of the country. All the social and land use structures 
in the region have rested on the presence of diamond mining since 
colonial days, when the Lunda Provinces were run as a "state with- 
in a state", with their own police, mining towns and agricultural 
systems. Before independence, the colonial diamond company, 
Diamang, controlled access and all economic activity, and policed 
the diamond province. All the main towns were built as centres 
for Diamang. Formal diamond mining and its ancillary structures 
was the principal means of employment. 
Responsibility for much of the Diamang infrastructure devolved 
after independence to the state diamond company, Endiama. 
Formal mines still have the legal responsibility for maintaining the 
infrastructure in their concession areas and for social projects - 
medical posts, literacy and agricultural projects. 
Although to per cent of the country's diamond taxes are remitted 
to the Lundas for development purposes - close to US$ 7 million 
per year since zooo - this has not trickled down to ground 
level in any substantive manner, and little state investment has 
yet been seen in the region's social infrastructure, health services 
and schools. Local officials have complained about a lack of access 
to mining data and what they consider insufficient royalty income 
from the mining ventures. Illiteracy in the rural areas is very high 
and a generation of adolescents has grown up with no educa- 
tion or training, but with full exposure to the casino economy 
of illicit mining. These are still mining provinces but their economy 
has been hijacked. 
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CASE STUDY: A COMMERCIAL COOPERATIVE - 
ARTISANAL GOLD MINING IN GUINEA 
THERE ARE AN ESTIMATED 100,000 ARTISANAL GOLD MINERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA. IN JANUARY 2000 
A GOLD MINING COOPERATIVE WAS FORMED BY FIVE GUINEAN MINERS, FOUR WOMEN AND ONE MAN. THEY NAMED 
IT THE SANIMUSO NGO RURAL GOLD PRODUCERS' COOPERATIVE. IN MADINGO, SANI MEANS GOLD AND MUSO 
MEANS LADIES. THE INITIAL MEMBERSHIP OF SANIMUSO WAS 84, BUT BY MID-2004 THE COOPERATIVE HAD 
GROWN TO MORE THAN 7,000 MEMBERS, 70 TO 80 PER CENT OF WHOM ARE WOMEN. CENTRED IN KOUROUSSA 
IN EASTERN GUINEA, SANIMUSO QUICKLY RECEIVED THE SUPPORT OF MOST ARTISANAL GOLD MINING VILLAGES 
IN THE PREFECTURE. 
Sanimuso is registered as an NGO and pays an annual registration 
fee to the prefecture office in Kouroussa. It has a Board of Directors 
made up of miners and former miners, all but one of whom are 
women. In each mining village there is a Village Mining Group 
composed of a president, vice president, mines operations 
manager, weighing manager, public relations manager/secretary 
and a Sanimuso gold buyer. 
Artisanal gold mining in Guinea 
Sanimuso's operations are extremely simple. Members mine wher- 
ever they want, as individual entrepreneurs. The only requirement 
is that they obtain permission from the local Chief, who has 
authority over community land, and that they pay a small 
monthly fee to the village, which goes into a community devel- 
opment fund. The miners sell their gold to the cooperative for 
cash, whenever they want. Some come in daily, some weekly 
and some wait until they need money. The cooperative has buying 
agents spread around the prefecture, with salaries based on a 
percentage of the gold they purchase. The Sanimuso price is 
pegged to the official price posted by the Central Bank of Guinea. 
Sanimuso normally sells the gold it purchases to a foreign buyer. 
Because it is registered as a cooperative, Sanimuso pays no taxes 
or fees on the income received from the gold. The exporter 
does pay tax and the miners (theoretically) pay income tax. 
Sanimuso's major problem is access to the cash needed to pur- 
chase gold from its members. Much of the Project Coordinator's 
time has been spent finding buyers. Recently, Sanimuso found 
an American businessman who has contracted to buy all the 
gold Sanimuso mines. The contract also contains provisions to 
provide water pumps and other equipment for the cooperative. 
Sanimuso is more commercial enterprise than traditional 
cooperative. Its members pay no fees for membership - although 
that subject is presently being discussed - and the cooperative 
provides few services to its members. It operates a very informal 
credit system for the miners, which it plans on formalizing and 
expanding. The Board has recently agreed that a levy of one 
dollar a month will be collected to establish a Sanimuso Miners 
Bank and other social activities. Sanimuso has also received 
support from an American NGO, the Institute of Sustainable 
Mining, which is introducing a new type of sluice that will 
increase the yields of gold to 9o per cent, from the present 
30 per cent. 
Sanimuso demonstrates that it is possible in an artisanal structure 
for miners to be entrepreneurs and to receive just prices for their 
work. There are no licence holders, no dealers _no- supporters, and 
no agents. The miner simply mines and sells gold to the coop- 
erative, which acts as the middleman and guarantor of a fair price. 
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CASE STUDY: 
THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
INTRODUCTION 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OFTHE CONGO (DRC) IS INCRED- 
IBLY RICH IN NATURAL RESOURCES, BUT HISTORICALLY THE 
CONGOLESE PEOPLE HAVE NOT REAPED MUCH BENEFIT. 
RATHER, A SMALL NUMBER OF BUSINESSES AND A POLITICAL 
ELITE HAVE POCKETED PROFITS IN A WAY THAT IS LITTLE SHORT 
OF GOUGING AND RACKETEERING. AS A RESULT, ORDINARY 
CONGOLESE - INCLUDING MANY OF THE 700,000 ADULTS AND 
CHILDREN WORKING AS ARTISANAL DIAMOND MINERS - HAVE 
HISTORICALLY TURNED TO SMUGGLING AND ILLICIT TRADE IN 
ORDER TO SURVIVE, ESTABLISHING AN INFORMAL DIAMOND 
ECONOMY THAT CONTINUES TO THRIVE. GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES, 
INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A BODY TO SUPPORT ARTISANAL 
AND SMALL SCALE MINING, AND THE DRAFTING OF A NEW 
MINING CODE IN 2002, AIM TO BRING THESE MINERS INTO 
THE FORMAL SECTOR, BUT SO FAR THESE HAVE HAD LITTLE 
EFFECT. ALTHOUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KIMBERLEY 
PROCESS IN THE DRC HAS PLACED THE DIAMOND INDUSTRY 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY, ENSURING INCREASED 
TRANSPARENCY, THE NEW RULES APPLY MORE TO EXPORTERS 
THAN THOSE FURTHER BACK ALONG THE PIPELINE, PARTICULARLY 
ARTISANAL MINERS AND THOSE THEY SELL TO. 
Artisanal mining is notoriously hard to control and continues 
to fuel an informal diamond economy, although to what extent 
is unclear. Official diamond exports in 2003 from the DRC were 
valued at $642 million, a 62.5 per cent increase in value over the 
previous year. While new and independent valuation was partly 
responsible for the increase, the effective implementation of 
the Kimberley Process, and the expulsion of Congo-Brazzaville 
from the Kimberley system in 2004, has brought an increased 
percentage of diamonds into the formal sector. Nevertheless, 
it is widely estimated that total diamond production exceeds 
National Capital Provincial Boundaries - International Boundaries 
Kirnbedite . Alluvial 
$I billion annually, which means that as much as $350 million 
leaves the country illicitly. The bulk of this is most likely from 
the artisanal sector. 
Until artisanal mining is brought effectively into the formal 
sector, and regulation and effective oversight is sustained, illic- 
it exploitation of the sector and its workers will continue. 
A parallel requirement is the need to provide viable employment 
alternatives. A corollary to this is the urgent need for legitimate 
foreign investment, but continuing political insecurity remains 
a major deterrent. 
BACKGROUND 
Five years of devastating conflict ended in 2003, and a tran- 
sitional government, tasked with leading the DRC to elections 
in 2005, presides over an extremely fragile peace. While the 
international community pumps millions of dollars of aid into the 
country, the state continues to lose revenue because it lacks 
effective control over the mining sector. The Centre of Evaluation, 
Expertise and Certification (CEEC), the autonomous government 
body set up to implement the Kimberley Process, has made huge 
and positive inroads in the diamond sector, particularly at the 
purchasing and export levels, but widespread deficiencies remain 
in the regulation of the artisanal mining sector. 
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Diamonds can be found in every province in the DRC, but the 
main producing areas are in the centre, northeast, and southwest 
of the country. The quality of diamonds varies greatly among these 
areas, from mostly industrial in central Mbuji Mayi, averaging 
$25 per carat, to high quality stones in Tembo, near the Angolan 
border, worth an average of $zoo per carat. 
There are two industrial mining companies in DRC - MIBA, 
a parastatal company established in the 196os, and Sengamines, 
set up in 1999 on one of the former MIBA concessions. There 
are also a number of semi-industrial operations, particularly 
around Tshikapa. These number fewer than 20 according to 
government officials. 
The vast majority of diamonds are mined artisanally by "creuseurs" 
or diggers, with little equipment other than shovels, sieves and 
pointed metal bars. 
The DRC's artisanal diamond mining sector is larger than that of 
any other country in the world. Officials believe that approxi- 
mately 700,000 artisanal diamond miners produce 8o per cent 
by value, and 70 per cent by volume, of official diamond exports. 
The majority of artisanal mining takes place in Kasai Occidental 
and Kasai Orientale, in central DRC. Despite the huge value of 
diamond exports, however, life for artisanal miners is desperate. 
Their pay is bad, they work in poor conditions and they have little 
physical or financial security. 
THE REGULATORY SYSTEM 
A new Mining Code was drafted in 2002 with the assistance 
of the World Bank, aimed at attracting new foreign investors 
by providing solid legal parameters and rules governing the 
prospecting, exploration, processing and sale of minerals.'5 
The Code contains regulations for the artisanal exploitation of 
diamonds, including the creation of artisanal mining zones, 
and it requires artisanal miners' cards for all diggers. 
According to the code, artisanal mining can be established within 
a determined geographical area if it is not feasible for industrial 
or semi-industrial mining. These areas are designated by an order 
from the Minister of Mines. An inspector from the provincial office 
of the Ministry is supposed to visit the proposed site to check 
that it conforms to the licensing requirements (e.g. that it is not 
near a road), and then authorizes the licence. 
All miners working in the designated zone must hold a valid 
artisanal miner's card, issued by the head of the provincial mines 
office. According to the Code, these are issued to "eligible persons 
who apply for them and undertake to comply with the regulations 
on protection of the environment, health and safety in the 
artisanal exploitation areas."26 Artisanal miners' cards cost approx- 
imately $25 and are renewable annually. These cards are only 
available to Congolese individuals "of age", suggesting that they 
are not available to children. 
The reality is hard to compare to the theory. Not one artisanal 
miner surveyed for this study had a licence, and the provincial 
Division of Mines representative in Kasai Orientale stated that 
of a possible 500,000 artisanal miners working in the province, 
only 2000-3000 had licences. It was significant that the depart- 
ment responsible for providing these licences and supervising 
artisanal mining could not give a definite figure on the number 
of artisanal miners' licences in use. In fact artisanal mining takes 
place throughout the province, not only in authorised zones. 
Mines spring up at the side of roads, in fields, and anywhere else 
people believe there may be diamonds. No official applications 
are made; young men simply begin to dig holes, some more than 
ten metres deep. 
And despite the Code, areas licensed for artisanal mining are in 
many cases unsupervised by the provincial division of mines. There 
is a serious lack of personnel capacity, complicated by inadequate 
transportation, vast distances and very bad roads. Kasai Orientale 
has eleven offices throughout the province, with its headquarters 
in Mbuji Mayi. However, they are unable to supervise the region 
adequately, even areas close to Mbuji Mayi. Without 4-wheel 
drive vehicles and staff, they are unable to carry out inspections 
for licence applications or of actual mining activities, including 
working conditions, environmental impact or military involvement. 
There are also problems with communication, particularly over 
such large distances, although the arrival of mobile telephones 
has addressed this to some extent. 
OFFICIAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE 
THE UNREGULATED - SAESSCAM 
In March 2003, the Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small 
Scale Mining (SAESSCAM) was established by Presidential decree. 
The main objective of SAESSCAM is to track the flow of minerals, 
including diamonds, from artisanal and small-scale mines to the 
point of sale, ensuring that all artisanally mined production is 
funnelled into the formal sector, removing the ties with smuggling 
and illicit sales. The aim is to ensure that all diamonds are exported 
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through the CEEC in Kinshasa. SAESSCAM was created following 
a pilot project in Tshikapa, in central Kasai Occidental Province. 
The pilot established several artisanal mining cooperatives around 
Tshikapa, and worked with semi-industrial operations. It has plans 
for health and road building projects in the area. SAESSCAM aims 
to organise cooperatives for artisanal miners nationwide, provid- 
ing training and advice, equipment, and small loans. A SAESSCAM 
official will be based at each artisanal mine site, and will accom- 
pany all goods to be sold, ensuring that the official process is 
followed, adequate records maintained, and that all goods are sold 
to registered, official buyers. 
SAESSCAM hopes to establish cooperatives with 300-400 miners 
at each mine. It has recently opened an office in Mbuji Mayi, but 
currently there is a lack of capacity and funds to get this office 
up and running. SAESSCAM operates with funds provided by the 
artisanal miners themselves. Sixteen per cent of the proceeds from 
licence sales goes to SAESSCAM, and, once the cooperatives 
are functioning, 15 per cent of the sales of their diamonds will 
return to this body. While many people point to the creation 
of cooperatives as a way to improve artisanal mining, the success 
of SAESSCAM remains to be seen. 
CONTRIBUTION OF ARTISANAL 
MINING TO THE ORC FrONOtAY 
Money is returned from the diamond industry to the state through 
licence fees for comptoirs, middlemen and diggers, as well as from 
export taxes. In 2003, diamonds worth $642 million were 
exported from the DRC through official channels although, as 
noted above, it is estimated that production may have exceeded 
$I billion, the remainder being lost through illicit channels. 
Diamond exporters pay a four per cent tax on the value of their 
diamonds: 1.25 per cent is taken in remuneration tax, 1.5 per cent 
in exit fees, and 0.25 per cent in exportation fees. A one per cent 
provincial tax is also supposed to be paid when diamonds are 
purchased. This one per cent is levied on the declared purchase 
value rather than the assessment of the country's independent 
valuators. This tax regime is currently ill-enforced and little revenue 
is actually returning to the provinces. This problem may stem, in 
part, from the retention of funds in Kinshasa. 
TOTAL OFFICIAL EXPORTS 
FROM COMPTOIRS IN 200427 
INDEPENDENT AVERAGE PRICE 
MONTH VALUATION (USS) CARATS PER CARAT (US$) 
January 40,227,296 1,571,642 25.60 
February 40,964,452 1,542,892 26.55 
March 49,434,660 1,462,982 33.79 
April 44,912,367 1,230,625 36.50 
May 44,723,844 1,420,794 31.48 
June 49,930,208 1,698,727 29.39 
July 72,192,017 2,144,547 33.66 
In addition to taxes paid, the government charges licence fees for 
diggers, middlemen or negociants and comptoirs. This is not effec- 
tively enforced in any of the three sectors. Annual licences for 
comptoirs cost $250,000 along with a $5o,ooo guarantee. 
The Mining Code stipulates that a fixed number of buyers is 
allowed on each licence, with additional buyers permitted as an 
exception. However this provision is being exploited by comptoirs, 
some of which have as many as 5o buyers on their books. Each 
buyer on a licence may pay as much as $25,000 to the comptoir, 
which in turn is supposed to pay $I5,ooo to the state for each one. 
Even if all the additional licence fees were paid, however, the state 
would receive significantly more if only ten buyers were allowed 
on each licence, and if this rule was enforced. If all loo,ooo 
estimated diamond negociants paid for licences - at $5oo each - 
the state would receive an additional $5o million, and all 700,000 
miners' licences would generate a further $17.5 million. On a total 
artisanal output of approximately $524 million in 2003 and an 
estimated $584 million in 2004 (not counting what may be 
smuggled out), these estimated licence revenues are not exorbitant. 
Given the improved export records of the past two years, it is 
possible to make a rough calculation of what the average diamond 
digger earns in a year. Based on comptoir purchases of $524 mil- 
lion in 2003 and a projected $584 million in 2004, 700,000 dig- 
gers average somewhere between $730 and $830 each in terms 
of the value exported. It is unlikely that they see much more 
DEVELOPMENT DIAMONDS AND POVERTY DIAMONDS: 27 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE IN THE ARTISANAL ALLUVIAL DIAMOND FIELDS OF AFRICA 
than one third to one half of this amount. To it, however, must 
be added the significant estimates of smuggled diamonds. Even 
with an allowance for these diamonds, it is hard to see how the 
average digger could be earning more than about a dollar a day. 
The state, therefore, receives a small proportion of its putative tax 
revenue, and diggers receive heavily discounted prices for what 
they produce. In addition, diamonds and revenue are lost through- 
out the pipeline for various reasons. At the level of extraction, as 
much as 30 per cent may be lost because of poor equipment, 
which prevents the complete retrieval of stones from the gravels. 
After extraction, parcels may be sold by members of the team or 
"uniformed elements", causing as much as 20 per cent of the 
overall loss. Sellers may not know the value of diamonds, and there 
is also smuggling by buyers or those working under the protection 
of influential people - the loss can be enormous at this level. 
EXPULSION OF CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE 
A demonstration that smuggling from the DRC persists, and 
that it can be diverted under the right circumstances, is seen in 
the huge fluctuations in diamond exports from the Republic of 
Congo (Brazzaville), a country with virtually no diamond produc- 
tion of its own. The expulsion of the Republic of Congo from 
the Kimberley Process at the start of July 2004 had an immediate 
impact on diamonds being exported through official channels 
in the DRC. In July 2003, artisanal diamond exports totalled 
$48.9 million, while in July 2004 the figure reached over $72 
million. A similar increase can be seen between DRC exports in June 
and July 2004. This represents a major success for the Kimberley 
Process, although it will be important to ensure that these 
diamonds continue to flow through official channels. 
EFFECTS ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES 
No visitor to Mbuji Mayi would ever imagine that hundreds of 
millions of dollars worth of diamonds have been extracted from 
the area. The infrastructure is terrible and there is only one paved 
road in the entire town. Diamond mining communities receive 
few benefits from the diamonds mined in their areas. Although 
one quarter of the four per cent export tax is supposed to be 
paid to the province on all diamond sales, this is not happening. 
And negociants in the diamond mining areas do not re-invest 
in the community. None of those interviewed for this report is 
investing in the diamond areas in any meaningful way, although 
some of the comptoirs in Mbuji Mayi claim to be buying medicine 
and other equipment for local hospitals. Without any visible ben- 
efits from the formal diamond economy, artisanal miners and 
their communities will continue to favour whoever offers the 
highest price, which may well be within the informal sector. 
ARTISANAL MINING - HOW IT WORKS 
The artisanal diamond mining industry works in a pyramid system. 
Approximately 700,000 artisanal miners sell their diamonds to 
an estimated ioo,ooo negociants, who then sell on to 12 licensed 
comptoirs for export. Vast mark-ups between each level leave arti- 
sanal miners at the bottom of this pyramid, earning an average 
of $I a day, while comptoirs regularly exceed the performance 
targets set by the Ministry of Mines at $5 million in exports 
per month. Some artisanal miners - better informed about prices 
through the growing use of mobile phones - have started to sell 
parcels directly to comptoirs in order to achieve the best price. 
For most, however, this is not possible. 
The following description of artisanal mining is based on interviews 
carried out for this report in diamond mining areas around 
Mbuji Mayi and in major mining areas in Orientale province. 
These include Banalia, 128 km from Kisangani, and Bafwasende, 
whose administrative centre is over 260 km from Kisangani. 
In Banalia there are 145 pits, and at the time of the interviews, 
there were 14,268 diggers, 137 negocionts, and 711 fournisseurs 
- "suppliers" - selling produce to the diggers. In the dry season, 
15,000 to 16,ooo diggers work in these pits, although this 
number halves during the rainy season when work is much more 
difficult. Seventy per cent of the diggers were 18-40 years old; 
ten per cent were between ten and eighteen; and 20 per cent 
were over 40. The under-18s and over-40s do not carry out 
the hardest tasks. Almost 8o per cent of the inhabitants of 
Banalia are men. 
Of 84 men interviewed for the study in one area, 25 per cent 
were mining diamonds because there is a lack of alternative work. 
Almost 37 per cent were hoping to find a big stone - "playing 
the lottery" - and 32 per cent were mining for "raisons historiques" 
- because that is what they had grown up doing. Five per cent 
were secondary and university students hoping to raise money 
during their vacation. Over half of those interviewed derived 
more than 50 per cent of their family income from diamond 
mining. Almost 42 per cent said they work full-time, 39 per cent 
part time and the rest work occasionally or as a supplement 
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to regular work or study. Sixty per cent of the diggers were not 
from the area, and were there solely to mine. 
In all areas visited, the majority of diggers worked in teams rather 
than as individuals, enabling them to amass more diamonds and to 
support each other. Teams consisted of two to ten men, each, with 
a "head" who looks after the diamonds and organizes the work. 
There is variation in the method of payment, but the majority 
of miners are given a percentage of the gravels extracted. Each 
pit is run by one or more heads, who lead all the diggers working 
in that pit. The first person to prospect an area becomes the 
head of the pit by default. In addition to the head, most mining 
areas have a mine committee - responsible for the running of the 
mine - which reports to the local customary chief. Committee 
members say that preventing conflict amongst miners is one 
of their main tasks. Each pit has a supporter who provides an 
initial investment for the purchase of equipment needed to start 
the operation. As in Sierra Leone and Angola, the supporters 
are often negociants. Miners feel obliged to take their parcels 
to this man, although such arrangements are not formalized. 
Rather than any kind of wage, diggers receive a split of the 
gravel taken out of the pit. Normally, gravels are split between 
the miners, the head(s) of the pit, the supporter and the local 
chief. The percentages vary but approximately 40 per cent goes 
to the diggers, 40 per cent to the head(s), to per cent to the local 
customary chief, and to per cent to the supporter. In some 
cases, if diggers find a large stone in their gravels, they may keep 
this and are not obliged to share any of the proceeds with the 
head of the pit. 
The miners are not employed officially. There are no contracts, no 
written conditions of work, and no Congolese labour laws are 
enforced. Some civil society groups have plans to create unions for 
artisanal diamond miners but these remain plans. In every pit there 
are informal syndicates but these are unstable and disorganised, 
dissolving when a pit closes, and fragmenting as the miners leave. 
Those working at the mines have no training or experience 
qualifying them to work as artisanal miners. The majority are 
unskilled labourers working with the most basic of tools. Nobody 
working at the mines has geological experience or any other skills 
particular to artisanal mining except those learned on the job. 
For example some people do understand which indicator stones 
to watch for. 
Many are miners because of the lack of alternative employment. 
Subsistence farming provides a fall-back, but agriculture remains 
Dealers weighing diamonds in the DRC 
difficult and under-developed. Diamonds provide short-term 
benefits, enabling a hand-to-mouth existence, but there are no 
possibilities of long-term saving. Congolese do not trust banks 
(with their history of collapse and embezzlement), but in any 
case, no diggers interviewed for this report had been able to save 
any money from diamond earnings. All say they would rather work 
for an industrial operation; this would provide them with security, 
both financial and physical, as well as healthcare. (Sengamines' 
minimum wage is $16o monthly - five or six times what the 
average artisanal miner earns.) 
There are few women working in the artisanal mines. Those pres- 
ent mainly wash gravel, and are not involved in digging. There are, 
however, many women at the mine site with food and drink to 
sell to miners, and a small percentage of them also work as 
prostitutes. This undoubtedly makes artisanal diamond mining 
a vector for HIV/AIDS. 
Many children are involved in diamond mining, often starting as 
young as twelve. School-age children go to the mines to earn 
money for their schooling. Some return to school, while others 
may continue mining for one or two years. Due to the dangerous 
and physical nature of the work, pre-adolescent children are nor- 
mally restricted to washing the gravels. Researchers were told 
that children only go to the mines during school holidays, but they 
observed many teenage boys both digging and cleaning. One 
group of younger boys said they were given loon Congolese 
francs a day (US$3.82) to wash the gravels, which they divided 
four ways. 
The vast majority of diggers are Congolese. They come from all 
areas of the country, and many move regularly, depending on 
where they believe they will find the best opportunity for diamonds. 
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Angolans may also be working illegally in some mines, but there 
are no accurate statistics on this. 
During the war, mining areas beyond government control 
were regularly visited by armed groups aiming to benefit from 
diamonds. This may no longer be the case, but the peace 
agreement remains fragile, and skirmishes are frequent. Mining 
police and the military have now been deployed, and armed 
personnel were evident in all of the artisanal mining sites visited 
for this report. Some are said to benefit from the largesse of 
negociants and suppliers. Although this remains hearsay, one 
Ministry of Mines official interviewed for this report said it is 
a serious problem. 
ARTISANAL MINING IN 
INDUSTRIAL CONCESSION AREAS 
In zooz Amnesty International documented the arrest and shoot- 
ing of dozens of artisanal miners working illegally in MIBA's 
concession area.28 MIBA has a concession of 78,oookm2 and is 
working on 12 kimberlite pipes in a small section of this area, 
called the Polygon. When the Polygon was first mined, a 
perimeter fence was erected to prevent illicit diggers from 
entering, but the fence has been broken for almost ten years and 
it is a major challenge for MIBA to protect the area. Villages 
line the edge of the Polygon and, due to the lack of alternative 
employment, artisanal miners enter the area - particularly at 
night - to dig for diamonds. MIBA has its own security force, as 
well as police and army security on site. 
Despite the possible security risks, people continue to risk 
their lives to earn money from diamonds. Officials esti- 
mate that 20 per cent of Mbuji Mayi's population is made up 
of artisanal miners - approximately half of the working age 
male population. 
Sengamines, the DRC's other industrial diamond mining company, 
takes a different approach to artisanal miners working on their 
concession. After initial negotiations with the local chief, 
Sengamines has agreed that miners can dig as long as they vacate 
areas that are about to be mined industrially. As the site around 
the main kimberlite pipe expands, artisanal miners move to dif- 
ferent areas. This does not eat into Sengamines official production, 
because the diamonds being mined artisanally are from topsoil 
that is commercially unviable for an industrial operation. 
Sengamines says that arms are not allowed on its concession. 
CONCLUSIONS 
AFRICA'S ARTISANAL DIAMOND SECTOR EVOKES THE 
PERUVIAN ECONOMIST HERNANDO DE SOTO.29 DE SOTO 
ARGUES THAT IN PERU THE INFORMAL ECONOMY EVOLVED AS 
A RESULT OF THE ENORMOUS COMPLEXITY OF PERU'S LEGAL 
MACHINERY AND ITS IMPOSSIBLE GOVERNMENT BUREAU- 
CRACY, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE RESULTED IN A SITUATION 
WHERE BRIBES ARE NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING, 
AND WHERE APPROXIMATELY 60 PER CENT OF PERU'S BUSI- 
NESS OPERATES BEYOND THE LAW. ARTISANAL DIAMOND 
MINING IN THE DRC, ANGOLA AND SIERRA LEONE MAY BE AS 
DRAMATIC, AND THERE ARE STRONG SIMILARITIES. BECAUSE 
ALL THREE COUNTRIES HAVE HAD SUCH A LONG HISTORY 
THROUGH THE 1970S, 1980S AND 1990S OF POLITICAL COR- 
RUPTION, BAD GOVERNANCE, LACK OF ADHERENCE TO THE 
MOST BASIC RULES OF BUSINESS ETHICS, AND ARMED CON- 
FLICT, DIAMOND ECONOMIES EVOLVED WITH THEIR OWN 
RULES. DESPITE RECENT CHANGES FOR THE BETTER IN THE 
REGULATORY SYSTEMS OF ALL THREE COUNTRIES, THE ARTI- 
SANAL MINING SECTOR IS STILL CHARACTERIZED BY SUB- 
MINIMUM WAGES AND UNSAFE CONDITIONS FOR THOSE WHO 
MINE DIAMONDS, BY CHILD LABOUR, AN ABSENCE OF ENVI- 
RONMENTAL CONCERN, BRIBERY, TAX EVASION AND OUT- 
RIGHT SMUGGLING. 
The strongest and most obvious conclusion is that the positive 
contributions of diamonds to the economic and social devel- 
opment of these countries are outweighed by the negative: 
The income received by all levels of government in the form 
of taxes and licence fees is negligible relative to the value 
of diamonds exported. A high proportion of the fees and 
taxes must be ploughed back into the diamond system to pay 
for monitoring, valuation and Kimberley Process compliance. 
The diamond industry generates a pittance for general 
government revenues and for any serious investments in 
development; 
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The governments in question cannot charge higher taxes 
for fear of stimulating smuggling. As a result, their mines 
ministries are neglected institutions, often without the basic 
tools needed to carry out their supervisory mandates. Their 
officials - key links in the diamond chain - are poorly 
paid, and the incentives for corruption are enormous; 
There are a million diggers working in the diamond pits of 
Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone, many of them sup- 
porting families. At least five million people, therefore, have 
some level of dependency on artisanal diamond mining. 
The enterprise is environmentally unfriendly. It is physically 
demanding, unhealthy work, with no job security. In many 
areas it is little more than indentured labour; 
While the diamond industry in these countries may appear 
to be competitive it is not. At the level of the digger, it is 
a dog-eat-dog casino economy. At the export level, the 
dominant market structure is dominated by a handful of 
companies and individuals. At the middleman or "dealer" 
level, price fixing, gouging, opportunism, fencing and 
smuggling are endemic. There is no free market in the arti- 
sanal alluvial diamond economy. 
As noted at the outset, this study concludes that artisanal 
alluvial diamond mining will never generate large amounts 
of revenue for the governments in question. The nature of 
alluvial diamonds and of artisanal mining makes any kind of 
meaningful taxation almost impossible. It is important, therefore, 
to ensure that any expectations about these diamonds are 
realistic. Second, it concludes that most artisanal diggers, 
working in a casino economy and, hoping to strike it rich, 
actually earn little more than a dollar a day. Their work is 
hard, dirty, and it is completely outside the formal job market. 
This places them squarely in the "absolute poverty" income 
bracket. There can be no talk of "development diamonds" 
under these circumstances. 
Given the large mark-up at the first point of sale, and the almost 
complete absence of a free market diamond economy in the 
digging fields, there are opportunities to increase the earnings 
of miners. The constraints, however, are political, economic, 
social and historical, and they are enormous. Paradoxically, any 
increase in earnings for diggers may attract more people to 
the already overpopulated diamond fields. This does not make 
the challenge less important, however. Real change could reduce 
the chaos and instability that the diamond fields spawn. 
At a minimum, diamonds could be the generator of decent 
incomes for hundreds of thousands of families, rather than 
the centre of unsafe, unhealthy, badly-paid piecework. There 
are enough pilot projects and enough experience to know that 
the potential is real. 
As noted at the outset of this report, change will not happen 
if it is left to chance, slogans and studies, and if those who know 
diamonds say that the responsibility lies elsewhere. Partnership 
Africa Canada and Global Witness welcome comments and 
suggestions, and look forward to working with the governments 
of countries where alluvial diamonds are mined, with Kimberley 
Process stakeholders, development organizations and civil 
society in seeking ways to bring meaningful and positive 
change to this important development challenge. 
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